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Liu Yongfu (L!u V"nh Phúc, !"#) was the leader of the Black Flags, a band that 
roamed the Sino-Vietnamese border region in the nineteenth century. Born in south 
China, and active in Vietnam, his greatest claim to fame was his contribution to the 
Vietnamese/Chinese anti-imperialism cause, as he killed Frenchmen Francis Garnier 
(d. 1873) and Henri Riviere (d. 1883). Consequently, both Chinese and Vietnamese 
scholars were eager to claim his successes for the Chinese nation, or the Vietnamese 
nation. Through an examination of the Sino-Vietnamese border region in the longue 
duree, using approaches like environmental history and cultural history, I argue that 
Liu should be contextualised in the local history of the region. In doing so, I will also 
examine how scholars’ contemporary concerns affect the writing of history. 
 
  1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1873, Francis Garnier, one of the French explorers who was part of the 
Mekong River exploration expedition was leading another adventure up the Red River 
when he was killed near Hanoi. In 1883, another French explorer Henri Rivière who 
followed Garnier’s footsteps came to the same sorry end, leading to the start of the 
Sino-French war. In 1884, after a bitter defeat in L!ng S"n (a town in north-east 
Vietnam), the French included a proviso in the 1885 Sino-French treaty for the 
withdrawal of Chinese bands. In 1894, when all imperial Qing troops have pulled out 
of Formosa in face of a Japanese invasion, one individual stood his ground against the 
Japanese. In 1905, Phan B#i Châu, highly regarded as one of Vietnam’s first 
nationalists, crossed over to Guangdong to seek refuge from the French police who 
have put a price on his head.
1
 
While the disparate series of events listed above seem to have little linkage, 
however, there is one factor that is common to this series of events—one man named 
Liu Yongfu (L$u V%nh Phúc, !"#).
2
 Born 10 October 1837 in Qinzhou ($!), 
Guangdong Province,
3
 Liu Yongfu was the leader of the Black Flags, one of the 
bands that traversed the region presently divided by the Sino-Vietnamese land border 
in the mid-nineteenth to twentieth centuries. Known to some as the Black Tiger 
General, he is often lauded for his contributions to anti-imperialism, in particular, his 
role in the deaths of Garnier and Rivière. His military expertise was also reportedly a 
                                                
1
 David Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885-1925 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 
pp. 121-2.  
2
 This is the hanyu pinyin transliteration of his name. He is more commonly known to English readers 
by the Wade-Giles transliteration of his name, Liu Yung-fu. 
3
 Due to later changes in provincial boundary lines, this area is presently in Guangxi province. 
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source of grief for French troops sent to Vietnam for the Sino-French War.
4
 
Consequently, the first article of the Treaty of Tientsin at the conclusion of the 1885 
Sino-French conflict had a clause that stated that all bands in Vietnam had to be made 
to withdraw to China.
5
 With that clause, he moved to Guangdong, and settled there. In 
1894, when Japanese troops were dispatched to conquer Formosa during the Sino-
Japanese War, they had to face a formidable foe, in the form of the indefatigable Liu, 
who left Guangdong, and went to Formosa to lead the local resistance against the 
Japanese.
6
 Although his active military career took a backseat in his later years, he 
sustained a continued interest in the politics of the region, as he sheltered Vietnamese 
nationalists like Phan B!i Châu and Phan Chu Trinh in his house when they were in 
Guangdong, and supplied them with various forms of aid, like donations, and a safe 
passage through the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands.
7
 
Liu Yongfu’s repeated success against French endeavours and his 
participation against Japanese invasion of Formosa in 1895 has attracted the attention 
of scholars in China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, leading to several biographies and articles, 
most of which are glowing reviews of his achievements that border on hagiographic. 
Also, his significant role in East Asian history also earned him the attention of several 
historians like Ella Laffey and Henry McAleavy in English-language publications. 
Despite the wide selection of works available on him, there is a general interest to 
classify him either as “Chinese” hero, or a “Vietnamese” hero. Scholars’ 
understanding of current nation-states and the political boundaries that separate them 
informed their classification of Liu as a national hero or pawn of either country.  
                                                
4
 Bruce Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 85. Elleman 
cites Spencer Tucker, who notes that the Black Flags made effective use of guerilla tactics to harass 
French troops. 
5
 Lewis Milton Chere, “The Diplomacy of the Sino-French War (1883-1885): Finding a Way Out of an 
Unwanted, Undeclared War” (PhD. Thesis, Washington State University, 1978), pp. 227-8.  
6
 Mai Zhaofeng, !"# [Black Flag Army] (Hong Kong: Asia Press, 1962), pp. 2-3. 
7
 Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, pp. 121-2. 
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This thesis, however, approaches him from the perspective of local history of 
the Sino-Vietnamese border region. Through an examination of the Sino-Vietnamese 
border region in the longue durée, it argues that local, rather than national concerns 
motivated Liu Yongfu. His activities can be regarded as part of a longer history of 
freedom and autonomy in the Sino-Vietnamese border region up to early twentieth 
century. It was, however, through his manipulation and self-promotion, which fell in 
line with the concerns of later officials and scholars, that he became a “national” hero 
in Vietnam and China. 
 
LIU YONGFU: CHINA OR VIETNAM? 
Despite the relatively large selection of secondary literature available on Liu 
Yongfu in various languages like English, Chinese and Vietnamese, the materials and 
approaches that scholars used were limited.  
Generally, English-language works on him tended to analyze his role in 
history, with the intention of understanding Sino-Vietnamese relations. These works 
tended to assume that he was acting on behalf of the Qing dynasty, either in an 
official or an unofficial capacity. Hence, his actions can be used as a lens to 
understand the dynamics of Sino-Vietnamese history. Both Lloyd Eastman and Henry 
McAleavy are interested in Sino-Franco-Vietnamese relations at a national level. This 
led to their interest in Liu Yongfu, whom they have regarded as an unofficial Chinese 
agent, who was sent by the Qing imperial house to Vietnam, to deal with the war 
between the French and the Vietnamese. They regarded him as the Qing dynasty’s 
solution to the dilemma of wanting to help Vietnam, but at the same time, not wanting 
  4 




While Eastman and McAleavy are interested in Liu for his role in Chinese 
diplomatic history, Ella Laffey is interested in his role in domestic Chinese politics. 
While the Sino-French War also forms the backdrop of her study, she has used Liu 
Yongfu’s activities and his interactions with the local officials during this period, to 
better understand the dynamics of local politics between local officials, and non-
official figures like Liu. This, in turn, is supposed to be a microcosm of national 
politics of imperial China in the late-nineteenth century.
9
 In sum, English-language 
works on him have studied him purely in the context of Chinese domestic and 
international politics. 
Similarly, Chinese-language publications have studied him for insights on 
Chinese history. Chinese scholars, however, have different concerns from Eastman, 
McAleavy and Laffey. Earlier Chinese scholars, like Luo Xianglin (!!")’s !!"
!#$ [Draft Biography of Liu Yongfu] and Li Jianer (#$%)’s "#$% 
[Biography of Liu Yongfu] were most interested in promoting Chinese culture, 
through the achievements of Liu Yongfu. The Chinese hero element also features 
strongly in Wang Zhaoliang, Liang Weiguo, Ma Gengcun ("#$%&'(%)*
+)’s "#$&'()*+ [Liu Yongfu and his Black Flag Army], and Chen 
Lizhong  (,-.)’s )*,+"#$ [Black Flag General Liu Yongfu].10 While the 
                                                
8
 Lloyd Eastman, Throne and Mandarins: China’s Search for Policy during the Sino-French 
Controversy, 1880-1885 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); Henry McAleavy, Black Flags 
in Vietnam: The Story of a Chinese Intervention (London: Allen & Unwin, 1968). 
9
 Ella Laffey, “Relations between Chinese Provincial Officials and the Black Flag Army, 1883-1885” 
(PhD Thesis: Cornell University, 1971), pp. 1-2. 
10
 Luo Xianglin (!/0), "#$!-. [Draft Biography of Liu Yongfu] (Taipei: Zhongzheng, 
1957); Li Jianer (123), "#$% [Biography of Liu Yongfu] (Taipei: Wenhai Publishing, 1977); 
Wang Zhaoliang, Liang Weiguo, Ma Gengcun ("#$%&'(%)*+)% "#$&'()*+ 
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Chinese hero element can also be detected in Yang Wanxiu and Wu Zhihui’s !"#




Vietnamese-language publications are interested in claiming the Black Flag 
general for Vietnam. Although Vietnamese-language secondary literature on Liu 
Yongfu like Tr!n V"n Giáp’s L!u V"nh Phúc: T!#ng C$ %en [Liu Yongfu: Leader of 
the Black Flags] was also interested in Liu due to his success in anti-imperialism, 
there were also attempts to claim him for Vietnam. In #$ng Huy V%n, Ch&'ng Thâu, 
and Minh H(ng’s scholarship, they tried to diminish his association with the Qing.12 
In doing so, they hoped to emphasise that his achievements were another instance of 
Vietnamese resistance in face of imperialism, rather than an instance of the Chinese 
sovereign helping its Vietnamese vassal, as McAleavy and Eastman have claimed.  
In sum, these scholars used China and Vietnam as their analytical units, to 
study Liu Yongfu. My thesis, however, studies Liu Yongfu from the perspective of 
local history of the Sino-Vietnamese border region. 
 
 THE SINO-VIETNAMESE BORDER REGION AND LIU YONGFU 
 My thesis, however, highlights two factors that have been marginalized in 
these studies – the Sino-Vietnamese border region, and Liu Yongfu.  
                                                                                                                                      
[Liu Yongfu and his Black Flag Army] (Jinan: Shandong People Publishing, 1985) Chen Lizhong (!
"#), &'()!"# [Black Flag General Liu Yongfu] (Jilin: Jilin People Publishing, 1995).  
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 Wang Zhaoliang, Liang Weiguo, Ma Cencun, !"#*+,&') [Liu Yongfu and his Black Flag 
Army] (Jinan: Shandong People’s Press, 1985); Chen Lizhong, &'()!"# [Black Flag General 
Liu Yongfu] (Jilin: Jilin People’s Press, 1995); Yang Wanxiu, Wu Zhihui, !"#$% [Critical 
Biography of Liu Yongfu] (Zhengzhou: Henan Education Press, 1990). 
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 Tr)n V"n Giáp, L!u V"nh Phúc: T!&ng C$ %en – M't Quân Nhân Thái Bình Thiên Qu(c Kháng 
Pháp Trên %)t Vi*tnam [Liu Yongfu: Leader of the Black Flags – A Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 
Soldier Resisting the French in Vietnam] (Hà N*i: Nhà Xu!t B+n [NXB] Sông Lô, 1958); #$ng Huy 
V%n, “#ánh Giá L,u V-nh Phúc và #*i Quân C. #en” [Assessing Liu Yongfu and the Black Flag 
Army], Nghiên C+u L,ch S- [NCLS] XXX, pp. 15-18, 25; Ch&'ng Thâu, Minh H(ng, “L&u V-nh Phúc 
Trong Cu*c Kháng Pháp C/a Nhân Dân Vi0t-Nam” [Liu Yongfu in the Vietnamese People’s Anti-
French Resistance], NCLS XXX, pp. 7-14. 
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 The spatial context – the Sino-Vietnamese border region – has been 
overlooked in these studies that focus on the nation. Divided between China and 
Vietnam, scholars with modern ideas of political geography have tended to use the 
“nation” or “nation-state” as their unit of historical analysis.
13
 A brief look into the 
region’s history, however, suggests that this framework is not useful for the border 
region. Through history, the Sino-Vietnamese border region has been the site for 
ambitious inhabitants to establish kingdoms separate from the ruling houses. In the 
eleventh century, Nùng Trí Cao established a short-lived kingdom in the L!ng S"n-
Guangxi area, independent of the ruling L# dynasty.14 Adjacent to L!ng S"n province, 
Cao B$ng was the site for the M!c dynasty in the seventeenth century, which 
established itself separately from the Lê dynasty.
15
 Given the Sino-Vietnamese border 
region’s history, evidently it is important to consider Liu Yongfu’s spatial context. 
 To understand the Sino-Vietnamese border region, this thesis benefits from 
recent literature on the Sino-Southeast Asia borderlands. In the last decade, scholars 
like Yang Bin, James Anderson, Patterson Giersch and Bradley Davis have 
approached the study of the region from the perspective of borderlands history. The 
Sino-Southeast Asia borderlands have a hilly geography that is in contrast to the 
plains that define the centers of Chinese and Vietnamese civilizations. Additionally, it 
is also far from these centers. Also, while the Chinese and Vietnamese civilizations 
have a Han and Kinh majority, a wide variety of ethnic groups live in the 
borderlands.
16
 Consequently, it is more accurate to examine the borderlands as a unit 
                                                
13
 Edmund Leach, “The Frontiers of ‘Burma’”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 3.1 
(October 1960), p. 49. 
14
 James Anderson, The Rebel Den of Nùng Trí Cao: Loyalty and Identity along the Sino-Vietnamese 
Frontier (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, in association with NUS Press, Singapore, 2007).  
15
 Ph!m Thu Hà, Ngô %&ng L'i, M!c "#ng Dung và V$%ng Tri&u M'c (H(i Phòng: H)i S* H+c H(i 
Phòng, 2000). 
16
 Many different ethnic groups live in China and Vietnam. In China, there are various groups like the 
Manchu, Tibetans, and Zhuang, who live in areas like northeastern China (Manchu) and southwestern 
China (Tibetans). The Han are the majority ethnic group in China, and account for approximately 90% 
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separate from China and Vietnam, and interacting with both. Yang fleshes out these 
characteristics of borderlands in his study of Yunnan. Although he was more 
interested in Yunnan’s role in world history, he also argues that it is impossible to 
study Yunnan without taking into consideration its ties to both China and Southeast 
Asia.
17
 Looking a little further south, Giersch arrives the same conclusions as Yang, 
in his study of the area that he termed “the crescent”, which stretches from the Sino-
Myanmar border region to the Sino-Thai border region. He studies how products like 
the Pu-er tea industry made “the crescent” a center in its own right in the eighteenth 
century, and how local leaders like Tsau Maha Vang carved out an autonomous space 




 Similarly, the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands periodically became a center in its 
own right. As the lowland states were not able to project their power into these areas, 
there was always room for local leaders and politics. Anderson’s study of the Sino-
Vietnamese borderlands in the twelfth century has shown that ambitious local leaders 
like Nùng Trí Cao were able to exploit the opportunities available to carve out a space 
that was separate from both the Chinese and the Vietnamese.
19
 Davis’ study of the 
Sino-Vietnamese borderlands in the nineteenth century suggests that the region was 
still a land of opportunity for its inhabitants like Liu Yongfu and Huang Chongying. 
                                                                                                                                      
of China’s population, and generally live in the plains in eastern China, including the Yellow River 
plain and the Yangtze River plain. There are also many ethnic groups in Vietnam, like the Hmong who 
live in the hilly areas in northwestern Vietnam, and the Khmer in the Mekong Delta. The Kinh, 
otherwise known as Vietnamese, are the majority ethnic group in Vietnam, and account for more than 
80% of Vietnam’s population. They tend to live in the plains like the Red River Delta.  
17
 Yang Bin, Between the Wind and Clouds: The Making of Yunnan (Second Century BCE to Twentieth 
Century CE)(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
18
 Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
19
 Anderson, The Rebel Den of Nùng Trí Cao. 
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His excellent study shows how the different factions – bureaucrats, anti-government 
activists, and everyday people – interacted within the region.
20
  
Although both studies are excellent in narrating the exciting lives of the 
individuals who lived in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands in the twelfth and 
nineteenth century respectively, a key factor – its spatial history is lacking. I address 
this lacuna with my thesis, by using a longue durée approach, focusing on factors like 
geography, and its effects on its inhabitants through time. Outside of geological time, 
my study broadly covers sporadic events from the twelfth century to the twentieth 
century. In doing so, I give a better overview of the region, and some of its 
continuities through time. This will contribute to a better understanding of the Sino-
Vietnamese border region, and add another dimension to the Sino-Southeast Asian 
borderlands. 
 The second aspect that has been marginalized in secondary literature is the 
historical Liu Yongfu himself. Previous literature on him has been more concerned 
with his credentials as a peasant-leader, or claiming him for nationalism. Therefore, 
he became marginal to these studies, which had greater interest in subjecting him to 
their dominant narratives, rather than understanding his life within his historical 
context. Hence, the second part of my thesis will center itself on his life. A brief 
biography introduces him within his temporal-spatial context, and also examines 
some of his motivations for his actions.  
 My study is important due to the centrality of individuals to nationalist 
literature, not just in Vietnam and China, but also in Asian post-colonial 
historiography. Several anti-colonial figures have become key to post-colonial 
narratives, and are excellent reflections of some of the contemporary concerns of their 
                                                
20
 Bradley Davis, “States of Banditry: The Nguyen Government, Bandit Rule, and the Culture of Power 
in the Post-Taiping China-Vietnam Borderlands” (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Washington, 
2008). 
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respective countries. The best example is probably Antonio Bonifacio, the national 
hero of the Philippines. In his study of Bonifacio, Glenn May argues that political 
concerns and interests have shaped Filipino scholars’ biographies of him. These 
concerns informed the production of knowledge to the extent that it led to fabrication 
and intentional misinterpretation of available sources.
21
 Similarly, in Malaysia, Cheah 
Boon Kheng demonstrates that due to To’ Janggut’s (Old Long Beard) appearance in 
colonial discourse as a “bandit”, nationalist scholars have styled him as the leader of 
an anti-colonial movement, even though he was a religious leader to other groups.
22
 In 
Vietnam, what started as a minor fabrication by Tôn !"c Th#ng, the President of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) to boost his credentials in his early career 
became extolled and elaborated upon in his biographies, due to the national and 
international concerns of SRV historians.
23
 In other words, biographies of particular 
figures are made to fit into national narratives. 
 Therefore, a study of Liu Yongfu will be particularly interesting. First, like the 
above studies, a historiography of him will give insight into the contemporary 
concerns of his mid-to-late twentieth century biographers. Second, a brief biography 
of him will achieve several things. As an illiterate figure, a study of his life will move 
away from the dominant trend of historians, who tend to study literate figures. This 
gives a peek into another segment in society. Also, as an inhabitant of the borderlands, 
whose life was not simply “Chinese” or “Vietnamese”, his experience will be of 
comparative value for studies of life in the borderlands.  
  
                                                
21
 Glenn May, Inventing a Hero: The Posthumous Re-Creation of Andres Bonifacio (Madison, 
Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996).  
22
 Cheah Boon Kheng, To’ Janggut: Legends, Histories, and Perceptions of the 1915 Rebellion in 
Kelantan (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005). 
23
 Christoph Giebel, Imagined Ancestries of Vietnamese Communism: Ton Duc Thang and the Politics 
of History and Memory (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004).  
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SOURCES 
Due to Liu Yongfu’s prominence and achievement, there is a wide selection of 
materials available in different languages, namely in Vietnamese, French, and 
Chinese.  
Vietnamese sources include dynastic records, interviews of Vietnamese 
participants in the Sino-French War, and literary materials like poetry and songs. 
These have, however, not been used extensively by Vietnamese historians, who have 
based their articles exclusively on a few sources, rather than the full range of sources 
available to them. For example, Thâu and H!ng construct a saintly image of Liu, 
based on the poetry of Nguy"n Quang Bích, who claims, “everybody extolled the 
Black Flags”. However, they did not point out Bích was actually the mandarin who 
acted as Liu’s aide when he was appointed governor of Tuyên Quang.
24
 Hence, his 
flattering poetry might have been motivated by his position, or the probability that 
flattering poetry is part of imperial culture, given Bích’s fondness for writing 




Perhaps the most commonly used resource in studies of Liu Yongfu are the 
Chinese records, which mainly consist of local officials’ missives sent back to the 
capital, nineteenth century newspapers, and Qing dynasty archives. In writing about 
Liu, the majority of scholars consulted the former, which was collected in document 
sets like !"#$%&' [Documents of Sino-Franco-Vietnamese Interactions];26 it 
is only in the last decade that newspapers and archives have been used as an 
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 Thâu and H!ng, “L#u V$nh-Phúc trong cu%c Kháng Pháp c&a Nhân Dân Vi't-Nam”, p. 12; Marr, 
Vietnamese Anticolonialism, pp. 46-7. 
25
 V( Ph)m Kh*i [!"#], Ti!n Lãm V"n Th#o [$%&'], Vi'n Hán-Nôm [VHN] A406, pp. 60-61; 
Nguy"n Quang Bích [()*], Ng$ Phong T$%ng Công Truy&n Kí [+!,-./], VHN VHv2072, 
p. 10. 
26!"#$%&' [Documents of Sino-Franco-Vietnamese Interactions] (Taipei: Central Research 
Institute Modern History Unit, 1962 [1983 printing]). 
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alternative source. Of these Chinese materials, the most frequently consulted source is 
Liu Yongfu’s oral autobiography, for instance, Laffey’s book chapter on Liu’s early 
years relied heavily on his autobiography.
27
 
Lastly, the French primary sources consist mainly of written accounts by 
participants, travelers to the region, and archival records. Although French secondary 
sources have been consulted by some of these scholars, French primary sources have 
hitherto remained unused by most of these scholars. Laffey briefly consulted some of 
these records, and Davis did much work on it, but some which remain unused include 
French officer, P. Neis’ account of his travels to this region after the Sino-French war, 
as part of the mission to demarcate the Sino-Vietnamese border.
28
 
Although I consult some of the sources that prior scholars have used, I will 
focus more on sources that have been overlooked. One of these sources include the 
collection at the Vi!n Hán Nôm, an under-utilised library which has an excellent 
collection consisting mainly of pre-twentieth century texts written in classical Chinese 
and the demotic Vietnamese script. Here, I was able to access local gazetteers of 
provinces like Cao B"ng in the Sino-Vietnamese border region written in the 
nineteenth century. Library research was also supplemented by a two-week fieldtrip 
to various sites that Liu Yongfu visited, and lived in, and these include his former 
residence in Qinzhou city, his ancestral hall in Bobai county, and his memorial hall in 
Dongping village in Bobai county. Materials collected include locally produced 
pamphlets that write on his local impact. 
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 Although Liu was illiterate, he orally dictated his autobiography to Huang Haian, this is found in the 
document set Sino-French War, vol. 2; Ella Laffey, “The Making of a Rebel: Liu Yung-fu and the 
Formation of the Black Flag Army” in Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China, 1840-1950, 
ed. Jean Chesneaux (California: Stanford University Press, 1972). 
28
 P. Neis, The Sino-Vietnamese Border Demarcation 1885-1887, trans. Walter E. J. Tipps (Bangkok: 
White Lotus Press, 1998). 
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METHODOLOGY 
In this thesis, there are two problems common in historical research, namely 
the problems of bias in primary sources, and also the fragmentary nature of the 
sources. 
Bias in primary sources comes in various forms. Liu Yongfu’s 
autobiography—as with any other autobiography—was coloured by his personal 
motivations, for example his desire to portray himself as heroic, and his attempts to 
diminish his archrival, Huang Chongying, the leader of the Yellow Flags. His 
autobiography was also distorted by his memory, given that it was recorded some 
forty years after the events recorded. There is also bias of other individuals, and this 
includes the imperial scribe who was assigned to Tuyên Quang, the province that Liu 
was governor of, who was an evidently unhappy man for his unappealing task. His 
general dissatisfaction joins a long line of his predecessors assigned to the undesirable 
posting to the Vi!t B"c, which was regarded by his predecessors as barbaric lands, 
and portrayed in this manner. To overcome the problem of bias, I attempt to separate 
the emotions from the facts. There is a heavy usage of statistical figures available in 
these local gazettes, for instance, the different types of taxation, and the population of 
the Vi!t B"c. These are used in comparison to other provinces, in order to yield 
meaningful figures. The emotions invested in writing these accounts that result in bias 
are also useful in creating an impressionistic view of the Vi!t B"c. By reading along 
the grain, as suggested by Ann Stoler, I will be able to show how the various scribes 
experienced the Vi!t B"c. This will in turn give an idea of how Liu Yongfu’s 
activities in this border region were viewed.
29
 
                                                
29
 Ann Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance” in ed. John Hall; Joseph Bryant, 
Historical Methods in the Social Sciences (Vol. III) (London: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 247-265. 
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A second challenge is the fragmentary nature of sources. The border region 
was divided by vague national boundaries and shifting provincial boundaries in these 
local gazettes. Apart from the imaginary administrative division of the border region, 
there is also a paucity of information in these local gazettes, due to the limited 
importance of the border region to their respective imperial governments, which took 
a rather nominal interest in these areas. In order to arrive at a more comprehensive 
view of the region, I have employed multi-disciplinary research, using insights from 
disciplines like geography and political science. For example, much of the physical 
characteristics of the Vi!t B"c, like its topography is obtained through geographical 
studies of Southeast Asia.  
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
 The second chapter of this study examines the stage on which historical events 
took place, i.e. the Vi!t B"c. It deals with the longue durée of the region, or in 
Braudel’s words—the “geographical time”.
30
 For a better introduction to Vi!t B"c, I 
will use a thematic approach, and some of the themes include weather, physical 
landscape, amongst others. In addition to a description of its natural and manmade 
environment, I will also examine some of the historical events that took place, and 
how various imperial courts dealt with these events. By looking at this region through 
the lens of the imperial courts, this chapter argues that the Vi!t B"c was important for 
its natural resources, yet, imperial courts had little ability to project their power in this 
region beyond extracting the region’s resources.  
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 The third chapter focuses on Liu Yongfu and his activities in the Vi!t B"c, or 
in other words, “individual time” in the region.
31
 Through a brief narration of his life, 
it examines the similarities and differences between his life and his activities in the 
mid-to-late nineteenth century in the Vi!t B"c, and the lives of inhabits of the Vi!t 
B"c prior to this period. In doing so, it hopes to flesh out some of the themes that 
were covered in the previous chapter, which examined the Vi!t B"c as a stage. To 
contrast his life within the context of the Sino-Vietnamese border region, I also give a 
broad outline of how his life was narrated by other scholars, to point out how the 
spatial and temporal context have been overlooked, in their study of the individual. 
Lastly, to further emphasize my argument that he is a product of the border region, I 
examine some of the themes that have been covered in my second chapter, to contrast 
some of the themes that prior scholars have used, in examining Liu Yongfu.   
 Building on the previous chapter, the fourth chapter deals exclusively with the 
historiography of Liu Yongfu. It examines how he became a subject of discussion, 
and how scholars examine him in relation to their dominant concerns. Some of their 
themes that are common to both PRC and DRV scholars include anti-imperialism and 
nationalism. It argues that due to their dominant concerns, they have overlooked his 
context. In doing so, it also sheds light on how contemporary concerns inform the 
process of history writing. 






CHAPTER 2:  
THE SINO-VIETNAMESE BORDER REGION –  
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
   
Liu Yongfu’s activities, which fell under the purview of both the Chinese and 
the Vietnamese anti-imperialism cause, led some scholars like Wu Zhihui from China 
and Tr!n V"n Giáp from Vietnam to examine and elaborate on his achievements. 
However, in these detailed studies of his exploits that celebrate his successes, the 
spatial and temporal contexts have been overlooked. Hence, this chapter addresses 
this oversight, through an examination of the Sino-Vietnamese border region in the 
longue duree. 
The Sino-Vietnamese land border is 1,150 km long, Vietnam’s second longest 
land border after Laos,1 stretching from Lai Châu province in the western end, to 
Qu#ng Ninh province at the eastern extreme on the Vietnamese side of the border. 
This is a total area of approximately 48,000 square kilometres, or approximately 
fifteen percent of Vietnam’s total land area.2 On the Chinese side of the border, lie the 
two provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan, collectively totalling approximately 630,800 
square kilometres. This area is approximately six and a half percent of China’s total 
land area.3 Despite being separated by a vague and shifting political boundary, 
reportedly marked by Ma Yuan with bronze pillars in the first century CE, and further 
separated by the erection of a frontier post in the sixteenth century,4 the border region 
is a geographically coherent region defined by rolling hills and craggy peaks. In 
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contrast to this hilly region, low-lying plains characterize the cultural heartlands and 
political centers of both China and Vietnam. 
As this thesis is mainly concerned with Liu Yongfu and his contexts, the 
spatial scale of this thesis is limited to the Vi!t B"c region – consisting of the 
provinces of Cao B#ng, Tuyên Quang, Thái Nguyên , H$ng Hóa, and L%ng S&n in 
Vietnam and parts of the adjacent Guangxi province in China. Through a historical 
overview of the Sino-Vietnamese border region, I argue that imperial control in the 
Sino-Vietnamese border region was limited and in a state of flux, vis-à-vis the plains. 
Consequently, during lapses of imperial control, this border region also became areas 
of opportunity for the adventurous or the ambitious.5  
 
 PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE VI!T B"C 
Situated at the interstices of Southeast Asia and China, at the latitude of 
twenty-two degrees North, like other parts of Southeast Asia that are in the 
monsoonal region, it has an alternately wet and dry season.6 However, due to its 
latitude, which is further away from the equator than most of Southeast Asia, 
therefore, there are months of low temperature, from December to February. In 
general, the region has a macroclimate that is alternately wet and dry, and cold and 
hot. While the macroclimate of the Vi!t B"c is similar to other parts of Southeast 
Asia, there are differences in the microclimate of the Vi!t B"c and the Vietnamese 
heartlands. In general, there is a difference of between two to ten degrees in the mean 
temperature between the Vi!t B"c and the Vietnamese heartlands. For instance, in the 
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colder months of December and January, temperatures in L!ng S"n fall to around ten 
degrees, but temperatures in Hanoi will only fall to fourteen degrees.7 
Constituted by alternately hard and soft rocks, a minimum elevation of 200 
metres above sea level characterises the region. This is in contrast to low-lying land in 
provinces like Hanoi and Ninh Bình, which is alluvium—the characteristic geological 
make-up of plains.8  The Sino-Vietnamese border region’s landscape was not lost 
upon Vietnamese imperial geographers and cartographers. In a map in a Nguy#n 
dynasty geographical survey, an undulating landscape characterises the Vi$t B%c 
region, which acts as an administrative watershed. As a result, the mountains and 
rivers had the effect of dividing Vietnam into regions, and these natural regions also 
corresponded to administrative regions. Separating Cao B&ng province and Tuyên 
Quang province is Côn Luân mountain, while '(o Tam mountain stood between 
Tuyên Quang and Thái Nguyên provinces.9 These depicted peaks are simply the two 
most prominent of the many recorded peaks in the area, which number around 
fourteen in Cao B&ng province, and about twenty-nine in Tuyên Quang province.10  
Due to the wet climate, another salient feature of the region’s physical 
landscape is the numerous water bodies that irrigate the region. Several large rivers 
originating from the eastern Tibetan Plateau serve continental Southeast Asia, 
including the Salween, which flows through Burma and Thailand, and the Irrawaddy, 
which flows through Burma. In Vi$t B%c, the Red River is the main waterway. This 
rain-fed fluvial artery, along with other rivers, cut deep gorges into the region’s high 
mountains and low hills. Water is further spread out by the tributaries branching out 
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from these main rivers.11 Like the mountains that divide the provinces, the rivers also 
serve as natural dividers of administrative units. In the aforementioned Nguy!n 
dynasty chronicler’s depiction of Vi"t B#c, a prominent waterway is the Nh$ Hà, 
which separated provinces like L%ng S&n, Cao B'ng, Tuyên Quang, H(ng Hóa, and 
Thái Nguyên in Vi"t B#c from other northern Vietnamese provinces like Hanoi and 
S&n Tây.12Apart from rivers, there are other water bodies in the region like streams 
and lakes, and two examples are the Mã Giang in Cao B'ng and the Giao Long Lake 
in Tuyên Quang province.13 Hence, in a bird’s eye view of the region, the landscape is 
dotted with green peaks, interspersed with winding brownish rivers. The relatively 
high elevation is not the only challenge nature posed to humans, in particular, the 
settlement of large groups of people. A second feature of Vi"t B#c that set it apart 
from the delta is the nature of the soil. There are mainly two types of soil in Vi"t B#c: 
acrisols and leptosols. Acrisols are mainly found in most of Vietnamese highlands, 
stretching from Vi"t B#c in the north, to the far south in )à L%t. Acrisols are nutrient-
poor and prone to erosion. Although it supports some amount of agriculture, like tea, 
rubber and oil palm, this is only possible in wetter areas. The region’s craggy 
landscape further problematises the poor soil condition, as the rain shadows, which 
this craggy landscape created, makes rainfall distribution uneven, making prolonged 
dry spells a common occurrence. In face of such challenges, landscape with 
dominantly acrisols is best suited for shifting cultivation of rice and kenaf. Leptosols, 
the second type of soil in the region, are shallow soils found in the area near Guangxi. 
The product of weathering, its stoniness makes it a soil with little agricultural 
potential. While its fertility could be improved with the application of plant nutrients, 
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its other properties like its low water retention limited fertilizer application. Given its 
inherent properties, the best land-use for leptosols is thus forest-growth.14 Hence, 
natural factors in this region, namely the combination of undulating landscape and 
poor soil have made this region optimal for small pockets of human settlement, but 
made large settlements of people difficult as the environment could not sustain large 
populations without human intervention.  
 In contrast, provinces in the Red River delta have proved more hospitable to 
larger human settlements. Potential natural vegetation of the tropics is controlled by 
two factors, water availability and altitude. While haphazard water availability, and 
generally higher altitudes in Vi!t B"c are limiting factors for settled cultivation, 
making it more suitable for shifting cultivation, the opposite is true for provinces like 
Hanoi. Generally situated lower than two hundred metres, and a recipient of regular 
rainfall that is not disrupted by relief, the factors for growth of abundant vegetation 
are favourable. Vegetation growth is further ameliorated by the dominance of 
fluvisols, a soil type that can support intensive agriculture, which can in turn support a 
high population density. For instance, the fluvisol soil in Java can support up to 1900 
people per square kilometre.15 Hence, while geography favours large human 
settlements in the delta due to its gentle topography and food availability, small 
human settlements are more viable in Vi!t B"c.  
The plethora of rock types and active plate tectonic movement in Southeast 
Asia meant that Southeast Asia has a significant amount of different types of ores. 
This made it a region full of natural resources, giving it great economic potential. 
Relative to other parts of Southeast Asia like Malaysia and Indonesia, Vietnam did 
                                                
14 R Dudal, “Soils of Southeast Asia”, Physical Geography of Southeast Asia, pp. 99-101; Goh, 
“Climate”, pp. 81-86.  
15 Richard Corlett, “Vegetation”, Physical Geography of Southeast Asia, pp. 95-101; Goh, “Climate”, 




not have a large store of natural resources. The above is particularly true of lowland 
Vietnam, which is also the heartland of Vietnam. The highlands of Vietnam, however, 
had more to offer in terms of natural resources. Formed through a process of 
subduction, whereby one portion of continental crust goes under another portion of 
continental crust, the highlands stretched from Vi!t B"c, to the Annamite chain, 
which terminates near the Mekong Delta. The tectonic processes not only gave the 
highlands its altitude, but at the same time, it also bequeathed the area with a large 
majority of Vietnam’s natural resources, including bauxite – the most important 
aluminum ore, uranium – used to fuel nuclear reactors, and tin, amongst other types of 
minerals. 
The natural resources are unique to the Vietnamese highlands in general, and 
the Vi!t B"c in particular. Their occurrence within the Vi!t B"c can be accounted for, 
due to its unique location. For instance, Southeast Asia is not a major producer of 
gold. Although it has the geological preconditions for the formation of gold, for 
instance, cenzoic volcanic rocks, which can be found in various parts of Southeast 
Asia like Mindanao, gold is not found in these areas due to altitude. Of the areas with 
cenzoic volcanic rocks, large amounts of gold is only found in Baguio in northern 
Philippines, as gold is formed in altitudes higher than 1500 metres. Incidentally, 
approximately four percent of the land area in present-day L#ng S$n is between the 
altitude of 700m and 1541m, with the highest point being M%u S$n mountain, which 
stands at the latter altitude. Given the altitude of some parts of Vi!t B"c, it is 
unsurprising that gold was found in the Vi!t B"c, in areas like L#ng S$n.16 The 
geology and topography of L#ng S$n are contributing factors that allow the formation 
of gold. 
                                                




Due to the natural conditions of the region, which is conducive to the 
formation of precious metals and minerals, in addition to other organic resources like 
trees, unsurprisingly, it was home to more than half of the mines available in 
Vietnam. These include gold, silver, bronze and iron mines. For instance, of the 
eighteen gold mines in Vietnam, fifteen of them were found in Vi!t B"c: there were 
five mines in Thái Nguyên, three in Cao B#ng, three in L$ng S%n, and finally, four 
mines in Tuyên Quang. Silver, bronze, and iron mines were found only in Vi!t B"c.17 
Metals are not the region’s sole natural resource, as it is also home to organic produce 
like highly prized woods and medicines. For example, one highly sought after wood 
was the “cay-ven-ven (Anisoptera supulchrorum), an incorruptible species, from 
which the Annamese produce their coffins”. Plants like thi (alpine yarrow), which is 
only found in L$ng S%n, and was named as one of the valuable products of Vietnam, 
as it was used to prevent books from being attacked by worms.18 
 
 HUMAN GEOGRAPHY OF THE VI!T B"C  
Despite the challenging landscape, the valleys – abundantly served by 
waterways – proved sufficiently attractive for scattered human settlement. Tuyên 
Quang, a province that was served mainly by the Lô Giang, and surrounded by 
mountains like the T&'ng S%n amongst several dozen others, had two prefectures, 
five districts, two sub-prefectures, thirty-nine cantons and 257 villages based on a 
study in the mid-nineteenth century.19 In the early nineteenth century, the official 
census was 3,831 !inh (males of a certain age range who are subject to taxation, 
military service and corvee requirements) and by the reign of T( )*c, the number of 
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recorded !inh increased to 4,179.20 A common settlement pattern is discernable, as 
villages formed near tributaries of the Lô Giang.21  
 There was a similarly low population in L!ng S"n, which had two prefectures, 
four districts, and three cantons. In the eighteenth year of Gia Long’s reign, there 
were 5300 !inh, and this number increased to 7491 !inh by T# $%c’s reign. By the 
way of contrast, B&c Ninh – a province in the Vietnamese heartlands, had four 
prefectures, two sub-prefectures, and twenty cantons. Population was, however, much 
higher than provinces in Vi't B&c – in the eighteenth year of Gia Long’s reign, there 
were 43900 !inh, and this figure increased to 45723 !inh by T# $%c’s reign.22  
 Apart from smaller populations, there were fewer Kinh who lived in Vi't B&c. 
Instead, it was populated by many other ethnic groups, including the Man 
(‘barbarian’), the Nùng, and Chinese. A survey conducted in the fourteenth year of T# 
$%c’s reign found that there were 324 Chinese !inh, and 150 Man !inh.23  
Despite the small population, there was some amount physical infrastructure 
found in these provinces, including temples, ancestral halls, and schools. For 
example, in L!ng S"n town, two prominent buildings are the Mi(u Trung V) [!"!
], located at the east gate of L!ng S"n town, and an ancestral hall [#$%] located to 
the southeast. There was also one school in each of the provinces of Cao B*ng, Thái 
Nguyên, H+ng Hóa and Tuyên Quang. Some of these schools were, however, recent 
developments. One such school was found in the Phú Bình prefecture in Thái Nguyên 
province, which was set up in the 1830s. Apart from schools, and temples, another 
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common feature of towns in Vi!t B"c include markets, for instance, there was a 
Qu#nh Lâm market in Thanh Th$y district in H%ng Hóa province.24  
Relative to the Vietnamese midlands and lowlands, it appears that 
Confucianism did not feature strongly in the Vi!t B"c, based on a comparison of the 
number of schools. B"c Ninh, a province in the Vietnamese lowlands, had a total of 
thirteen schools during the early years of the Nguy&n dynasty, and schools were found 
not just in the prefectures, but also in the districts – a smaller administrative. For 
instance, V'n Giang district had a school established in the fifth year of Minh M!nh. 
Education infrastructure appeared to be equally comprehensive in the Vietnamese 
midlands province of Tây S(n. During the Nguy&n dynasty, fifteen schools were 
recorded in the province. By contrast, in the provinces in Vi!t B"c, education 
infrastructure was sorely lacking. Thái Nguyên province only had one school; the 
large province of H%ng Hóa (which vaguely correspoonds to the present-day 
provinces of Yên Bái and Lào Cai and more than twice the size of B"c Ninh province) 
also only had one school in the prefecture of Gia H%ng, which was established in the 
third year of Thi!u Tr)’s reign (1844).25 
 
 LIVING IN A BORDER REGION 
Incorporated by various imperial Vietnamese houses supposedly since 
Vietnamese historical beginnings that are traced back to Hùng V%(ng, naturally, Vi!t 
B"c provinces featured in local gazetteers. While there was interest in these 
provinces, these local gazetteers of the Vi!t B"c provinces suggest that there was little 
control of these provinces. According to James Scott, classic state functions were 
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“taxation, conscription and prevention of rebellion.”26 In the local gazetteers of the 
Vi!t B"c, taxation, population, and rebellions were three of the most commonly 
recorded items. But apart from these three items, little else was recorded about the 
region, relative to other provinces in the Vietnamese heartlands like B"c Ninh. These 
provinces acted like “fugitive landscapes”, which eluded the state’s attempt to make 
them legible. In his study of state control, James Scott points out that in recent past, 
modern states have attempted to make areas under their control legible through the 
enumeration of the state. This was achieved through taxation and population census. 
In the case of “fugitive landscapes” that are usually in areas that are difficult to 
access, there is state obsession to make them legible, but this is checked by the 
difficulty of factors like the landscape.27 In the case of the Vi!t B"c, some of these 
difficulties are distance from the centers of imperial power, physical relief, and 
cultural attitudes of the state towards Vi!t B"c.  
With the advent of modern transportation and improvements to the 
transportation network since the early twentieth century, travelling from Hanoi to a 
town in the Vi!t B"c like Lào Cai will take about ten to twelve hours by train or bus. 
Given the short time required for travel today, it is perhaps hard to imagine how 
physical factors like distance and relief posed difficulties to the practical application 
of political power in the administration of Vi!t B"c. However, prior to the nineteenth 
century, physical distance served as a check towards the practical application of 
political power. While most areas in the Vietnamese heartlands like B"c Ninh were a 
mere day away from Hanoi, making administration of these areas relatively pain-free, 
the same does not apply to areas in the Vi!t B"c. Transportation in the nineteenth 
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century was possible through mud roads, on foot or by horse. Through this mode of 
transportation, nearer places in the Vi!t B"c were at least one week away from Hanoi. 
For example, up to the nineteenth century, Tr#n Yên district in H$ng Hóa (presently 
Yên Bái province) was “seven day journeys” away from Hanoi, while it took “twelve 
day journeys” from Hanoi to get to Th$%ng Lang sub-prefecture in Thái Nguyên.28 
The deterrent effect of physical distance is perhaps not unique to Vietnam, but 
common in other societies as well. Eric Hobsbawm, writing on pre-twentieth century 
banditry, observed that it “is commonplace that brigands flourish in remote and 
inaccessible areas … where preindustrial travel is naturally both slow and cumbrous. 
The construction of good and fast modern roads is often enough to diminish banditry 
notably.”29  
Vi!t B"c’s physical relief in great part contributed to the distance between the 
political and cultural center of imperial Vietnam and its edges. Though various parts 
of Vi!t B"c were located only approximately one to three hundred kilometers from 
Hàn&i, its mountainous topography lengthened travel time. Defined by an altitude of 
at least 200 meters above sea level, Vi!t B"c’s relief stood in stark contrast to the low 
plains of the Vietnamese midlands and heartlands. En-route from Vietnam to China, 
Vietnamese envoys sent on diplomatic missions to China visited some parts of the 
Vi!t Bac. Unsurprisingly, the imposing landscape comprising craggy peaks cut by 
great rivers served as a muse for some of these travellers. One such traveller was Tr'n 
Danh Án, who described the majestic Mã An mountain in H$ng Hóa province.30 
While it served as a muse for Án, other travelers, like envoys sent from Vietnam to 
China were intimidated by the landscape, as “the hardship of travel” was one of the 
themes of envoy poetry. The road from the south to the north passing through L(ng 
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S!n was frightening for envoys. In particular, the !"# [Ghost Gate Frontier Post] 
was one dreaded point, and led eighteenth century envoy, Nguy"n #$ to pen his 
anxiety towards it in a poem entitled, “Passing Ghost Gate Frontier Post”.31  
The mountainous landscape also had an impact on the climate in the Vi%t B&c. 
Though north Vietnam was located in the temperate monsoon region, and experiences 
wet summers from the months of June to October, and dry, cool winters from 
November to March, there were differences in the microclimate. Altitudinal 
differences altered the microclimate in the Vi%t B&c, leading to colder winters and 
haphazard rainfall in the area. For example, in L'ng S!n, temperatures in January 
average twelve to fifteen degree Celsius, but can dip to less than five degrees, and at 
times, even reach sub-zero temperatures, as temperatures fall by half a degree for 
every hundred metre increase in altitude.32 Imperial scribes, used to the Vietnamese 
heartlands’ climate that was conducive to agriculture, did not view this difference of 
climate favourably. For instance, in the !"i Nam Nh#t Th$ng Chí, climate in an area 
in the Vietnamese midlands like B&c Ninh and S!n Tây were described as being 
“similar to Hanoi”, making them favourable to cultivation. By contrast, the weather in 
areas like Cao B(ng were described as being inhospitable, and consequently, made 
the area difficult for cultivation.33 In short, this was not an attractive area for 
inhabitation, and perhaps, also difficult for administration, due to the natural 
challenges this region posed.  
Due to the natural conditions of Vi%t B&c, it was not conducive to the 
agriculture, in particular, the cultivation of rice—a food item that defines what it 
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means to be Vietnamese.34 Rice was difficult to cultivate in Vi!t B"c. There was also 
a difference in groups of people who settled in the mountainous Vi!t B"c and the 
plains of the Vietnamese heartlands. While the plains of the Vietnamese heartlands 
were mainly populated by the Kinh (or the ethnic Vietnamese), the provinces in the 
Vi!t B"c had an ethnically mixed population. Some of the ethnic groups who lived 
amongst the rolling hills include the Tày, the Nùng. Its rich resources, however, did 
encourage Chinese merchants living adjacent to the Vi!t B"c to settle here and 
establish trading networks. In the mid-nineteenth century, officials reported that there 
were 324 Chinese merchants living in Tuyên Quang province.35 By contrast, the Kinh 
people settled in plains of the Vietnamese midlands and heartlands, and were 
predominantly settled farmers, whereby social status was obtained through education. 
Ethnic composition had an impact on how an area was viewed officially. For instance, 
records of a predominantly Kinh area like B"c Ninh were replete with famous people 
and historical places (to be discussed later). There was a difference in the way local 
gazetteers depicted a province in the Vi!t B"c, where the ethnic composition was 
more varied, and there were fewer Kinh. What little that was recorded apart from the 
three classic state functions appeared to be exotic and dangerous. For instance, one 
interesting facet of Tuyên Quang province that was recorded in the Tuyên Quang 
T#nh Phú was about a “strange flying ghost” that was “human by day and a flying 
ghost at night.” According to the scribe, it lives like a normal person, and has wife 
and children, and the only way one can distinguish this ghost from other humans is its 
flared nostrils.36 Ethnic difference did indeed have the effect of eliciting judgment 
even in a province in the Vietnamese midlands like S$n Tây. Official sanction of the 
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province appeared to be confined to the towns, which are situated on low-lying areas. 
When writing about the more mountainous regions of S!n Tây, one official described 
these areas as “culturally primitive” areas to be avoided by the learned, as it was full 
of “wanderers who abandoned themselves to every vice” and “evil bandits” who 
could anywhere. Imperial chroniclers from the Nguy"n Dynasty did not let this point 
pass. In writing about Tuyên Quang, they used the term of “lazy” to describe all the 
other ethnic groups that lived there, including groups like the Nùng and the Hmong. It 
was also recorded with disdain that this was an area with little literacy – a mark of 
civilisation from the point of view of an imperial scribe.37   
Due to the environmental factors, like the natural challenges that Vi#t B$c 
posed to administrators, and to cultural factors, like the perceived lack of cultural 
refinement, there appeared to be little desire to know more about the Vi#t B$c, and 
perhaps, to project more control over the region. Nevertheless, it was incorporated 
within imperial Vietnam, as it was of sufficient importance to the various imperial 
houses. 
The reasons for the integration of Vi#t B$c was primarily economic, and of 
secondary interest, political. This was evident from the local gazetteers, which reflect 
official perspectives. In the An Nam Kí L!"c, there were extensive records regarding 
matters of population, land distribution, troop enrollment, taxation, and composition 
of population. For example, it records the population at 9,176,745 and recorded the 
number of men who were eligible for military service, and finally, there were also 
records of the number of different ethnic groups. More important than interest in 
knowledge production on the population of Vietnam and its potential manpower for 
political control, there was mainly economic interest in the Vi#t B$c and its 
                                                




contributions to the imperial coffers. For instance, a province like Thái Nguyên did 
not simply contribute to the head tax and land tax, which other provinces in the 
Vietnamese heartlands, like Ninh Bình did. There were additional contributions to 
taxation, in the form of taxes on the mines, like the five gold mines that were in Thái 
Nguyên. Of greater interest was perhaps Tuyên Quang province, which seems to have 
contributed the lion’s share, as it was home to gold, silver, bronze and iron mines, 
which were all taxed. Unsurprisingly, some officials refer to Tuyên Quang as the 
“golden city of the country”.38 
There was also interest in the border region for other natural resources like 
wood, and medicinal herbs, and other resources that can be found in the plentiful 
forests in the Vi!t B"c. Two of the items include birds and horses. The chim lu tu, 
possibly a cormorant found in Cao B#ng was a sought after item, as it was capable of 
catching fish. Of greater importance are perhaps the horses that were found also in 
Cao B#ng. In times of peace, horses raised in Cao B#ng were used as mounts, but in 
times of war, they became an important part of Vietnamese warfare. In the 
seventeenth century, both the Tr$nh in the north, and the Nguy%n in the south had 
cavalry in their armies.39 
Beyond economic interest, occasionally, Vietnamese dynasties took an interest 
in the Vi!t B"c for political reasons. Depending on the situation, the various imperial 
houses either took a conciliatory approach towards unrest in the region, or they might 
clamp down on unrest with an iron fist. For instance, when &oàn Th' Nùng led an 
uprising in Cao B#ng in September 1503, it was rapidly suppressed. While Nùng’s 
uprising was short-lived, the M(c dynasty also in the sixteenth century had more 
success, as they were able to keep a stronghold in Cao B#ng for more than eight 
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decades, after their ultimately unsuccessful attempt to usurp the Lê dynasty. 
Nevertheless, the M!c dynasty also came to an end, as the Tr"nh lords suppressed it. 
The ability to keep the Vi#t B$c under control was not always consistent. The Nguy%n 
dynasty in the nineteenth century seemed to take a different tack, with a more hands-
off approach to unrest in the Vi#t B$c. In dealing with unrest, it resorted to two 
strategies. It either dispatched a local chief allied with the imperial court to attend to 
the unrest, failing which, it would simply bestow the victor with imperial titles 
accorded to its former allies. One such local chief who was tasked with dealing with a 
local “bandit” during the Gia Long reign (r. 1802-1820) and was rewarded for his 
efforts was Mã Th& Tr!ch (!"#) from Tuyên Quang, who upon quelling 
successive uprisings in Thái Nguyên that plagued officials, was awarded the title of 
military envoy ($%&'/Tuyên Úy '!i S().40  
Having examined the factors that resulted in the status of Vi#t B$c as a 
secondary frontier, the following section will illustrate how the factors translated into 
application in a Vi#t B$c province. And through a comparison with how another 
province in the Vietnamese cultural heartlands, namely B$c Ninh, was administered 
differently, it serves to illustrate how an integrated province was administered 
differently from a province that was part of the secondary frontier.  
 
 The Case of Cao B!ng and B"c Ninh  
Allegedly part of Vietnam under the name of V) '"nh division during the 
H*ng V+,ng period, its beginnings as an independent administrative unit is traced 
back to 1578 during the M!c dynasty, when it was known by the name of Cao Bình 
prefecture. It assumed its present-day name of Cao B-ng only in the late-eighteenth 
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century, during the Tây S!n period. While population figures were unknown in 
previous years, there were 8.083 !inh recorded in the eighteenth year of Emperor Gia 
Long (1820), and that increased to 9,439 in five decades. Divided into one prefecture, 
five districts, several of the districts were administered as sub-prefectures.41 In 
Vietnamese administration terms, the designation of a district somewhat reflects the 
level of integration. Broadly speaking, administrative units like counties, districts and 
villages were regarded as an integral part of Vietnam. Even though locally selected 
leaders governed lower administrative units like villages, they were regarded as 
“Vietnamised”. Of these administrative units, perhaps the only “other” that exists is 
the sub-prefecture [châu], which signifies an unpacified area whose control has been 
delegated to a local chieftain, who was not Kinh. These sub-prefectures also usually 
did not have clearly defined borders. Hence, the number of sub-prefectures in a 
province can be used as one of the indicators of the level of integration within 
Vietnam. 
In this regard, Cao B"ng, alongside other provinces in the Vi#t B$c like L%ng 
S!n and Tuyên Quang were some of the ‘wild’ regions in Vietnam, as these provinces 
were peppered with several sub-prefectures, which furthermore were home to non-
Kinh groups like the Hmong and the Nùng. By contrast, B$c Ninh – a province in the 
Vietnamese heartlands – was not home to any sub-prefectures.  
Supposedly known as V& Ninh division during the mythical Hùng V'!ng 
period, B$c Ninh was always part of Vietnam. For instance, when ‘Vietnam’ was 
Giao Ch( (second century CE), B$c Ninh consisted of the two districts of Luy Lâu and 
Long Biên. Moving away from the mythical period, it was known by different names 
through the years: in the early Lê period (980-1009), it was known as B$c Giang; in 
                                                




the L! dynasty (1009-1225), it was known as Gia Lâm, and during the Tr"n dynasty 
(1225-1400), it was known first as B#c Giang, and later, it was known as Kinh B#c. It 
became known as B#c Ninh only during the third year of Minh Menh’s reign (1823). 
In the early-nineteenth century, there were 43,900 !inh living in B#c Ninh, and this 
increased to 45,723 !inh in the mid-nineteenth century. Unlike Cao B$ng (and other 
provinces in the Vi%t B#c), there were no sub-prefectures in B#c Ninh, which was 
purely divided into counties, districts and villages. There were three counties, two 
sub-counties, and nineteen districts, in addition to numerous villages.42 Such 
similarities in recording landscapes were perhaps universal to states interested in 
making landscapes legible. 
Based on the descriptions in the local gazetteers, it appears that the only 
similarity between Cao B$ng and B#c Ninh was the state’s desire to enumerate these 
two provinces. Hence, similar information about these two provinces in the local 
gazetteers includes their population, taxation, and males eligible for the military draft. 
Beyond the state’s desire to enumerate these two provinces, there were more 
differences in the local gazetteers’ description of Cao B$ng and B#c Ninh. Apart from 
enumeration, the only other official interest in Cao B$ng was political occurrences. 
One such instance was the Nùng Trí Cao rebellion in Cao B$ng in the eleventh 
century. However, beyond official interest in political unrest, there seems to be little 
cultural interest in the Vi%t B#c. What little poetry that was written on Cao B$ng was 
composed by Vietnamese ambassadors en-route from Vietnam to China.43 In ancient 
versions of travelogues, these diplomatic poets penned their thoughts about the 
majestic mountains and lakes in the Vi%t B#c.44 Extensive records of the area were 
confined to descriptions its economic resources, and there were only several ‘famous 
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people’ who served as officials during the Nguy!n dynasty and historical vestiges, 
like the city of the M"c family, unlike B#c Ninh, where the items under these two 
categories were extensive.45 This suggests that Cao B$ng’s integration within the 
Vietnamese polity was fairly low. 
By contrast, the B#c Ninh local gazetteer suggests a high level of integration 
with the Vietnamese polity. Located one day away from the capital, Hanoi, B#c Ninh 
was home to one gold mine. Despite its relatively humble contributions in terms of 
economic resources, its local gazetteer suggests it was highly valued for its cultural 
and political contributions to imperial Vietnam. These include B#c Ninh residents, 
and its historical vestiges in imperial Vietnamese history. In the local gazetteer, after a 
standard listing of the physical landscape (mountains and rivers), and towns, bulk of 
the gazetteer was devoted to people who contributed to imperial Vietnamese history, 
and places of interest to imperial Vietnam. The impressive list included: imperial 
examination graduates, famous officials, warriors, righteous men, famous Buddhist 
monks, gentlemen, physicians, and filial sons. In some instances, their contributions 
to the Vietnamese royal house was noted, and elaborated upon.46 One Buddhist monk, 
Nguy!n V"n Hành’s (!"#) expertise earned him the position of imperial advisor in 
L% Thái T&’s court. Female contributions to imperial Vietnamese history were not 
neglected either. B#c Ninh’s females were noted either as various emperors’ 
concubines, or as virtuous widows. The most famous involved a lady, Tr'n Th( Trinh 
from Gia Lâm, who was widowed at the tender age of sixteen, but lived a chaste life 
up to the ripe old age of ninety-six. These were some of B#c Ninh inhabitants’ 
historical contributions to imperial Vietnamese history.47  
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Worthy of note as well, were some of the historical vestiges in B!c Ninh. 
Listed and described were shrines, temples, graves, and old battlefields, amongst 
some other items like trees and rocks. While institutions like shrines and temples were 
equally common in the Vi"t B!c provinces, what sets B!c Ninh apart from the Vi"t 
B!c are the personages worshipped in these temples. Two of the deities 
commemorated in these temples include L#c Long Quan, reportedly the mythical 
father of the L#c Vi"t [the hundred Vi"t], and An D$%ng V$%ng, another important 
figure in the foundation myths of Vietnam.48 In short, it had an important place in 
imperial Vietnamese history, beyond its economic contributions. By contrast, a 
province like L#ng S%n had shrines of local, rather than imperial concern. One 
prominent local figure worshipped was Nùng Trí Cao.49 While there was a V&n Mi'u 
(temple of literature), it was a recent building that dated back to 1810 (see table 1 
below for some of the temples found in the provinces of B!c Ninh, L#ng S%n and Cao 
B(ng for further illustration of the point about the lower level of cultural integration 
of the Vi"t B!c). The above suggests greater cultural integration of areas closer to the 
political/cultural centre of Vietnam, in contrast to a lower level of integration of Vi"t 
B!c.  
B!c Ninh (lowlands)  Cao B(ng (Vi"t B!c)  
Chùa Thiên Tâm (Yên Phong district) and Chùa 
C) Pháp (*ình B+ng district) – dedicated to L, 
Thái T-, founder of Lí dynasty 
*.n Giang Châu (Th#ch Lâm district) – dedicated 
to the Phù Th!ng and Phù Nhu" brothers, who 
resisted the invasion of Cao B(ng by the M#c 
family  
*.n L#c Long Th/n (Gia Bình district) – 
dedicated to Vietnam’s mythical founder, L#c 
Long Quân 
*.n Xuân L0nh (Th#ch An district) – dedicated to 
Tr/n Quy't, who resisted the invasion of the M#c 
family  
Mi'u Kinh D$%ng Vuong (Siêu Lo#i district) – 
dedicated to one of Vietnam’s mythical leaders, 
Kinh D$%ng V$%ng 
*.n Thanh Trung (Th#ch An district) – dedicated 
to Nguy1n *ình Bá, a successful scholar from the 
province during the Lê dynasty  
Table 1: Comparison of select temples found in the Vietnamese lowlands and Vi"t B!c50 
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 VI!T B"C IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY 
The above has examined the spatial context of the Vi!t B"c in the longue 
duree. To understand the milieu that Liu Yongfu lived in, a second component 
involves the temporal context. In general, Vi!t B"c was in turmoil in the mid-
nineteenth century, as a new wave of unrest broke out in the region, and various 
ambitious leaders took the opportunity carve out little pockets in the Vi!t B#c.   
 The first amongst them is Nùng V#n Vân from B$o L%c in Cao B&ng province. 
In 1832, equipped with a large army, he attacked and took Tuyên Quang, Thái 
Nguyên, Cao B&ng and L%ng S'n. What ensued was a tug-of-war between Vân and 
Nguy(n troops, where towns that fell were retaken, and fell once again, with no clear 
winner emerging from this tussle. When the odds shifted decisively against Vân’s 
favour, he chose to retreat to Qing territory, rebuilding his army before a final attack 
against the Nguy(n. However, cornered in a three-prong attack, he was finally 
defeated. This unrest lasted three to four years, and had a lasting impact on the region, 
which became vulnerable to various new groups entering this area from the Qing.51 
To heighten the vulnerability of the region, in the 1800s, the south China and 
Vi!t B"c region was hit by a series of natural disasters, like successive earthquakes, 
triggering off some of serious social unrest in the region, including widespread 
uprisings, like the Taiping Movement (1850-1864) and the Panthay Movement (1855-
1873), removing the remnants of Qing official control over the region.52 Consequently, 
there was an intense flow of human traffic across the border, in particular, figures 
associated with subversion. One of them was San Tang (!"), a “bandit” from the 
Qing side, who successfully attacked and took L%ng S'n in 1851. Unable to oust him, 
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the Nguy!n official in L"ng S#n simply negotiated a settlement with him, and 
henceforth, San Tang settled in L"ng S#n.53 While the Nguy!n had little luck with 
San Tang, they had better luck with Zhang Shiliu (!"#). Zhang entered Cao B$ng 
with over a thousand troops, and succeeded in taking control of the town in 1863. But, 
through the help of a woman who worked in Cao B$ng town prison, who led the 
Nguy!n troops into Cao B$ng, the Nguy!n army was able to oust Zhang and retake 
Cao B$ng town.54 While Vi%t B&c was no stranger to sporadic social and political 
unrest, this increased in frequency in the mid nineteenth-century. 
 Beyond local factors, there were world historical forces at work. In Europe, 
France was looking to share in a slice of the colonialism pie, and in particular, a part 
in China. Having already gained a foothold in Cochinchina, French sought entryways 
into China via Vietnam. With Jean Dupuis’s successful navigation of the Red River, 
and the establishment of its viability as a route into China, French interest in Tonkin 
was piqued. Vi%t B&c, which was valued for its economic worth under the Nguy!n, 
also had economic value to the French. However, it would not be expedient for the 
region to remain autonomous, as its economic value was no longer derived from 
taxation, but from trade to China. 
 It was into a region in the midst of social and political change, that Liu 
Yongfu entered. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
LIU YONGFU IN HISTORY OF  
THE SINO-VIETNAMESE BORDER REGION 
The previous chapter gave a broad overview of some features of the Sino-
Vietnamese border region, like the environment, its geography, and some official 
perceptions towards the region. This chapter examines how this region was 
experienced through one of its most prominent nineteenth century inhabitants, Liu 
Yongfu, who was famous/notorious (depending on the perspective) for his successes 
against French adventurers Francis Garnier and Henri Rivière.  
It starts with a brief biography of Liu, as a means of contextualising this study. 
It aims to give a more in-depth introduction to the person that this thesis is devoted to. 
In doing so, it aims to introduce the history of the Sino-Vietnamese border region 
over a span of eighty years, through the life of an individual—Liu’s life span. It also 
serves to set the stage for the next chapter, which will deal with how individual lives 
became subjects of history and the politics of history. 
  Following the brief biography, I examine aspects and periods of his life that 
various scholars have highlighted. In replacement of the framework employed by 
several prior scholars, I will introduce themes and facets of Liu Yongfu’s life, which I 
believe reflect on life and the realities of living in the Sino-Vietnamese border region. 
In doing so, I argue that aspects like spatial context, and individual agency have been 
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 LIU YONGFU: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Born 10 October 1837 in Qinzhou, Guangdong (present-day Guangxi), Liu 
Yongfu was Liu Yilai (!!")’s only son from his marriage to a widow who brought 
along a son from her previous marriage. His early years were characterised by 
constant movement, and uncertainty, as his father moved the household from village 
to village, in search of sustenance, as opportunities run out in their previous abode. 
Uncertainty did not originate merely from a life of constant movement—in his 
teenage years, Liu had to take different odd jobs like mending clothes, and working in 
the rivers, to help make ends meet in the Liu household.
1
  
This pattern might have continued, if not for a turning point in his life. In his 
study of bandits, Eric Hobsbawm points out that normal peasants who recourse to 
banditry share some common characteristics, one of which is the lack of family 
burdens.
2
 This seems to have been true in the Black Tiger General’s case. At the age 
of seventeen, tragedy struck the Liu household. Liu Yilai and his wife finally lost the 
fight against their marginal existence, when they fell ill, leaving Yongfu and his elder 
stepbrother orphaned. Without any parents to care for, Liu and his brother set off to 
join other vagabonds in the village.
3
 As with other small-time vagabonds, they first 
approached the leader of the band in the county nearest to their village. It was in this 
manner, that Liu first became a follower of Zheng San (!#). With the changing 
fortunes of his various leaders, and also due to the different opportunities available to 
him, he went through a series of leaders, some of whom included Wu Er ("$), 
Wang Shilin (%&'), and Huang Sihong ( )*). He finally ended up with Wu 
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Yazhong (also known as Wu Kun) (!!"/!") being his last leader.
4
 In the 
meantime, his qualities, like his alleged strength and leadership drew to him a core 
group of followers, who swore personal loyalty to him, following him as he changed 
leaders. Some of these include Wu Fengdian (!#!), Huang Shouzhong ("#$), 




His life in a roaming band in Guangdong might perhaps have continued, but 
factors external to Liangguang (Guangdong and Guangxi) and also related to 
Liangguang resulted in his move to Vietnam. In particular, the early nineteenth 
century was one of the most challenging periods imperial China faced. These 
challenges came in the form of external threats, like the Opium Wars, and internal 
threats like the Taiping Uprising. Incidentally, both occurred in southern China, and 
in particular Liangguang was the stage where both internal and external challenges 
occurred. Frederic Wakeman, in his study of Liangguang in the early nineteenth 
century, noted that the government could no longer easily control the region. 
Rumours were more convincing than government pronouncements. It is within this 
context, that roaming bands, like one of those that Liu was member of, had leeway to 
conduct their activities without fear of imperial harassment, as the Qing dynasty had 
its hands tied, dealing with the challenges posed by the two Opium Wars.
6
 This 
situation changed in the mid nineteenth century. Finally freed of foreign harassment, 
accompanied by the dismantling of the Taiping Uprising, Qing forces were now able 
to concentrate their efforts on quelling socio-political dissent in Liangguang. This was 
also part of the greater effort to eradicate the Taiping Uprising at its base. 
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Consequently, the roaming bands, which had free rein previously, had to come up 
with means to deal with the new government presence. Some of them, like one of 
Liu’s former leaders, Wang Shilin threw in his lot with the Qing dynasty.
7
 Others, like 
Liu’s last leader, Wu Yazhong decided to take flight, and fled to the Vietnamese 




A part of his life that was of great interest was how he came to establish the 
Black Flags as an independent unit. With regards to this, there have been different 
views. Yang Wanxiu and Wu Zhihui speculate that Liu might have left Wu, because 
he was afraid of the repercussions of not being able to procure supplies for Wu’s 
troops. Luo Xianglin adds a twist to this speculation, as he suggests that Liu had no 
wish to accept Wu offer of his sister’s hand in marriage.
9
 In any case, despite the 
meanings attached to this event, it is probable that the event was entirely spontaneous 
and unplanned. A local gazetteer records that a stray cannon killed Wu Yazhong.
10
 
Consequently, his followers, who had their own section leaders, dispersed with the 
lack of central leadership. Without a leader, the section leaders, like Liu Yongfu who 
led the Black Flags, and Huang Chongying (!"#), who led the Yellow Flags, now 
found themselves fighting against each other for their individual benefits in the 
Vietnamese border region. While Huang Chongying moved towards Hà D"#ng in 
Tuyên Quang, Liu Yongfu moved towards L$c Yên Châu in Tuyên Quang province. 
Unfortunately for the Black Flags, this area was occupied, and they found themselves 
in occupied territory, as the White Hmong, led by Bàn V%n Ngh&a ($%!)claimed 
this area as their own. Through the usage of bribery, Liu Yongfu was able to persuade 
                                                
7
 Li, Biography of Liu Yongfu, p. 19; Yang, Wu, Critical Biography of Liu Yongfu, p. 20. 
8
 BTBNLT, pp. 44-6. 
9
 Yang, Wu, Critical Biography of Liu Yongfu, pp. 34-5; Luo, Draft Biography of Liu Yongfu, p. 55. 
10
 CBST, pp. 2-3. 
  41 
one of Ngh!a’s followers to betray his leader, who was decapitated, and presented to 
Liu. Henceforth, he was able to find a foothold in Vi"t B#c.11  
He did not let his conquest go unappreciated. Eager to obtain official support 
from the Vietnamese imperial house, he sent a missive to the Nguy$n court, informing 
the court of his achievements — he had succeeded in ousting Bàn V%n Ngh!a from the 
area. Although the Nguy$n court’s presence in L&c Yên Châu was unclear, the 
Nguy$n dynasty seemed to have followed precedent of simply acknowledging a 
change of leadership in the region, through the conferment of titles, as discussed in 
the previous chapter. Although this event involved changes in local power, his 
eradication of one of the Nguy$n dynasty’s sources of annoyance in the Sino-




Liu’s life in the Sino-Vietnamese border region in the next ten years did not 
seem extraordinary relative to his predecessors who have called this region their 
home. He became one of the several leaders amongst the various roaming bands who 
lived in the Vi"t B#c. He did not seem to have been the dominant leader, as he had to 
constantly compete against other leaders for territory, and economic interests. One 
such leader was Huang Chongying, his former colleague under Wu Yazhong, who 
now became his nemesis. As with other leaders in the Vi"t B#c, one of Liu’s chief 
interests was economic profit, since his effective leadership depended on his ability to 
supply his followers with means of livelihood. One such means available in the Sino-
Vietnamese border region was the lucrative trade in opium and a main node in this 
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trade artery was Lào Cai.
13
 The chief beneficiaries of this trade were He Junchang (!
"#), a Chinese merchant who had de facto control in Lào Cai, and Huang 
Chongying – who was now He’s ally.
14
 This difference in economic opportunities led 
to a tense relationship between the two leaders of the Yellow and Black Flags, as they 
attempted to gain control over the available economic resources.
15
  
In 1873, Liu Yongfu gained the upper hand in this tug-of war, and ousted both 
He Junchang and Huang Chongying from Lào Cai. In doing so, he gained control of 
the Red River and the right to tax the goods that were traded along the river. Left 
without a base, Huang went in search of new allies for his cause. His search was 
answered in the form of Francis Garnier, who in turn needed local help for his 
adventure in the Red River delta.
16
 
Francis Garnier was part of an ambitious group of French explorers, who 
attempted to find trade routes to China. In the nineteenth century, access to the 
Chinese market was highly desired by Europeans travelling to Asia, as they ran out of 
markets for their goods. The French were no different. Consequently, they attempted 
to find new trade routes to China through the Mekong River – a project in which 
Garnier participated. While the Mekong River did not meet its objectives of finding a 
viable trade route into China, another Frenchman, Jean Dupuis, had better luck with 
the Red River, which provided access to southern China.  
                                                
13
 Bradley Davis, “States of Banditry: The Nguyen Government, Bandit Rule, and the Culture of Power 





 Li, Biography of Liu Yongfu. 
16
 Tr!n Huy Li"u, “Góp # Ki$n v% vi"c &ánh Giá L'u V(nh-Phúc và Quân C) &en trong Cu*c Kháng 
Pháp + Vi"t-Nam” [Some opinions about the Assessment of Liu Yongfu and the Black Flag Army in 
the Anti-French Resistance in Vietnam], NCLS 39 (June 1962), p. 23; Ch',ng Thâu, Minh H-ng, “L'u 
V(nh-Phúc trong Cu*c Kháng Pháp c.a Nhân Dân Vi"t-Nam” [Liu Yongfu in the Vietnamese People’s 
Anti-French Resistance], NCLS 36 (March 1962), p. 14; Jean Dupuis, A Journey to China and the 
Opening to the Red River to Trade (trans. Walter Tipps) (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1998), p. 63. 
  43 
Local politics and French imperialism found themselves to be strange 
bedfellows in this instance.
17
 
With their mutual strength boosted through their alliance of convenience, 
Huang and Garnier started off their conquest in Hanoi—and encountered initial 
success in their endeavour. Hanoi was the capital of Vietnam for several dynasties. 
During the Nguy!n dynasty, however, it was no longer the political capital of the 
ruling house. Nevertheless, it maintained its status as the cultural heart of Vietnam. 
Although it was no longer the political capital, Huang and Garnier’s activities in 
Hanoi were of great concern to the ruling house based in the central Vietnamese city 
of Hu", due to its importance to Vietnam. To address their concerns, they sent out a 
missive to one of their nominal officials—Liu Yongfu. 
Setting off for Hanoi in response to imperial request was the perfect 
opportunity for Liu to vanquish his long-time nemesis, Huang Chongying. In 
November 1873, he set off for Hanoi, and pitched camp in the environs of Hanoi. 
After a series of fights, in one of the skirmishes, one of his chief lieutenants, Wu 
Fengdian succeeded in killing Garnier through the melee. As a testimony to the 
importance of leadership in such fights, the alliance of French troops and Huang’s 
troops scattered in retreat, and Huang’s and French ambitions were temporarily 
thwarted. A resounding victory was declared, and Liu did not spare any time in 
reporting this to the Nguy!n court. This time round, he was conferred the title of 
governor of S#n Tây, H$ng Hóa and Tuyên Quang (!"!#/Tam Tuyên T%ng 
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!"c). He was also ‘persuaded’ to return to the Vi#t B$c to resume this position, while 
control of Hanoi was handed over to one of the Nguy%n dynasty’s trusted aides.18 
After the ‘C&u Gi'y Incident’ (‘Paper Bridge Incident’) – as this engagement 
came to be known – Liu confined his activities within the Sino-Vietnamese border 
region. Using some of the authority attached to his newly conferred title, he set out to 
fortify his position in the Vi#t B$c, leading to his ascendancy. An imperial nod did not 
guarantee his dominance within the Vi#t B$c region. Due to its mountainous 
landscape and the cast of characters who roamed this area, it was conducive to the 
formation of small roaming groups, as mentioned in the previous chapter. His rival, 
Huang Chongying was able to find another foothold in the Vi#t B$c, after the defeat 
of Garnier, and even after Huang’s defeat, his former followers continued to be a 
source of consternation for Liu Yongfu. Additionally, there were potential rivals, like 
!èo V(n Tri, the leaders of the Tai people in Lai Châu, who carved a niche for 
himself in the region spanning Vietnamese and Lao spheres of influence. Hence, Liu 
found himself constantly having to find a better footing in this untamable landscape. 
While he was unable to achieve dominance within the region, he was able to better his 
economic opportunities. To do so, he established himself in Lào Cai, the Vietnamese 
border town south of Yunnan in China Lào Cai, by its location, was settled with 
Chinese merchants, who were part of the cross-border trade networks. In replacing He 
Junchang as the ‘protector’ (a euphemism for overlord) of Lào Cai, Liu also took over 
the lucrative job of taxing the rich Lào Cai. In short, far from the inactivity suggested 
by the lacunae in other scholars’ works of him, Liu was busy building up and 
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In addition to building up his power in the Vi!t B"c region, he also re-
established connections with his native Guangxi. With his newfound status in the Vi!t 
B"c, he was able to ‘return in glory’ to his native Guangdong. While some 
biographers cite it as a filial act, whereby Liu reburied his parents in a better location, 
there was a practical element to his visit. In his visit, he recruited other wandering 
‘bare sticks’ (young men who were not able to marry and establish families due to the 
skewed gender ratio) like himself to his cause, trusting the linguistic and cultural bond 
that they shared, over recruits from the Vi!t B"c itself.20  
Garnier’s death in 1873 checked French colonial ambitions temporarily. In 
1883, however, ambitions to create a navigable route to China through the Red River 
were renewed, under the command of Henri Rivière. In this instance, the Vietnamese 
empire sought the help of Liu Yongfu again. Once again, Liu took the long journey 
from his main base in Lào Cai to Hanoi, where the French party had once again set up 
camp. While T# $%c used precedent in dealing with the French, Henri Riviére did not 
learn from his predecessor, Francis Garnier. In a skirmish in the environs of Hanoi, 
one of the Black Flags killed Henri Rivière. Left without their leader, the French 
troops dispersed, leading Liu to declare yet another victory against the French. This 
gave him legendary status amongst the Chinese and Vietnamese, as the Black Flags 
were the only troops, informal or otherwise, to accomplish the feat of defeating 
Europeans twice in combat.
21
  
Unlike Francis Garnier, whose endeavour was individual and not backed by 
French authorities, Henri Rivière’s expedition was officially sanctioned. Garnier’s 
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adventures were part of a tentative campaign that represented an early stage of French 
imperialism in Indochina, which was defined by individual endeavors. These 
adventures had the silent nod of the French colonial office, but did not have official 
support. The French colonial office was willing to acknowledge these expeditions 
should they prove successful, but did not want to be associated with them, should they 
lead to conflict. Such was the attitude towards Garnier’s adventure, which ended with 
his death. The context was, however, different for Henri Rivière’s expedition to the 
Red River. By the 1880s, French had entered a stage of imperialism whereby it was 
concerned with increasing its share in the colonial pie. In 1883, the French managed 
to obtain a treaty from the Nguy!n dynasty in Hu", declaring that Tonkin was a 
French protectorate. This event in has often been narrated by the Vietnamese as when 
they m!t n"#c (lost their country). As Rivière was part of a clearly planned Tonkin 
campaign to establish French presence in Tonkin, and increase French colonial 
presence in Asia, the war did not end with the battle after French troops under his 
command scattered. Undeterred, more French troops were sent to Hanoi, and what 
ensued was a fight between the French and a joint effort by the Vietnamese, Chinese, 
and local Vi#t B$c forces. This culminated in the Sino-French War (1884-1885), and 
ended with the Chinese renouncing all claims of suzerainty on Vietnam. In Chinese 
history, this was another event in the humiliating late-nineteenth century, when China 
had its suzerainty in the region diminished once again. For both the Chinese and the 
Vietnamese, however, one bright spark both Chinese and Vietnamese historians 
emphasise is the Black Flags’ successes. Of all parties they condemn for this ‘failure’, 
only Liu is free of blame. In fact, his successes, are picked out and praised, while 
other scapegoats are found for his failures. Some of these scapegoats include Chinese 
officials and/or Vietnamese officials who scholars blame for caring more about their 
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self-interest than for the country’s interests. This episode ended with Liu and majority 
of his followers retreating to his native Guangdong, whereby he was given yet another 
nominal position within the imperial court, as a trainer in the local militia.
22
 
His young life appears to have defined his later life, as he continued his 
peripatetic lifestyle, even as he returned to China. Rather than settle down at one 
place, he constantly moved around in the Sino-Vietnamese border region, but in this 
case, he remained in the Liangguang area. In the meantime, he did not simply allow 
his networks within the Vi!t B"c to lapse. Instead, he was active in facilitating 
movement of people within the Sino-Vietnamese border region. During a time when 
modern travel documents like the passport were non-existent, a recommendation letter 
from Liu was a sine qua non for travellers within the Sino-Vietnamese border region, 
who sought a safe passage through this region that was still dominated by local forces. 
Some of the more famous beneficiaries include Phan Chu Trinh and Phan B#i Châu, 
two Vietnamese who were later celebrated as Vietnam’s first nationalists. Liu Yongfu 
hosted Phan Chu Trinh when he was in Guangdong while Phan B#i Châu obtained 
safe passage through Vi!t B"c based on Liu’s influence. Using a letter from Liu 
Yongfu to his former subordinate, Huang Shouzhong, who settled in Vietnam, Phan 
B#i Châu was able to safely go from Guangzhou to Hanoi.23  
In 1895, China was falling victim to a new power with imperialist ambitions—
neighbouring Japan. One of the first places that Japan set its sights upon, was 
Formosa, a Chinese province. Ridden by internal court politics, and also attracted by 
the prospects of conserving resources, it occurred to the Qing court to call upon local 
forces in south China to deal with this latest threat to its sovereignty. Liu Yongfu was 
sent along as an aide to Tang Jingsong – the commander of Qing troops in Guangxi 
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when Liu was fighting the French – to defend Formosa. While Tang gave up on the 
fight against the Japanese and returned to Liangguang before it started, Liu alleged 
rallied native Taiwanese to the cause of defending Formosa. His efforts were 
unsuccessful, and he eventually had to retreat to Liangguang with his troops. While 
this was yet another unsuccessful venture, historians and biographers used the same 
rationale in explaining his defeat in the Sino-French War – he was thwarted by the 
Qing imperial court. Hence, while he was defeated, they applaud his efforts, and 
blame his failure on Qing officials like Tang.
24
  
As the Japanese took over Formosa and started a new regime there, Liu fled 
back to Guangdong. By then close to his sixties, the next twenty years of his life did 
not involve any more armed conflict. He was, however, still active in local politics, 
and like most opportunistic local leaders, he aligned his political allegiance with the 




The above is a brief overview of his life, spanning some turbulent eighty 
years, whereby the Sino-Vietnamese border region alternately fell in and out of 
administrative reach of both the imperial Nguy!n and Qing courts. The administrative 
reach of the Nguy!n and Qing courts in the Sino-Vietnamese border region was felt 
only when they had politico-military interest in the region. Even then, they had to 
depend heavily on the help of established leaders in the region. In this case, help came 
in the form of Liu Yongfu, who allied himself with the various imperial causes, as 
opposed to Huang Chongying, who allied himself with the French. As exemplified by 
Liu’s life, the Sino-Vietnamese border region became an important factor in the 
multiple changes in the nineteenth century. His life has, however, become material for 
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the various themes that historians and biographers have implemented. The following 
section demonstrates how his life has been narrated for such purposes. 
 
NARRATING LIU YONGFU 
The Early Years (1837-1860s) 
 That his early years are relatively well documented comes as no surprise, 
given that different scholars often use this period to set the tone of the themes they 
choose to emphasise in the rest of his biography. For instance, Chinese scholars Yang 
Wanxiu and Wu Zhihui choose to emphasise his impoverished background in order to 
make an argument that Liu’s military endeavours were peasant struggles in nature.
26
 
By contrast, writing from Hong Kong, Mai Zhaofeng emphasise on symbols of 
Chinese culture, like heroic stories from The Romance of the Three Kingdoms that 
influenced Liu in his childhood, in order to promote his successes as a product of 
strong Chinese culture.
27
 These events usually occurred from his birth to his teenage 
years. 
 His early years had the function of setting the tone for the rest of the 
biography. Studies were mainly concerned with explaining how Liu Yongfu came to 
be in command of the Black Flag Army, and also how he ended up in Vietnam, and 
the details and interpretations vary, depending upon the writer’s agenda. For example,  
Mai explains that Liu’s righteousness (in the Confucian sense) was the key asset that 
made Liu attractive to his core group of followers that eventually became the Black 
Flag Army, omitting his pragmatic concerns. Yang and Wu offer a different 
interpretation. In dealing with his agglomeration of followers, they assert that his 
followers grew, because they emphathised with his class background, and class 
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reasons also motivated his move from leader to leader in the early years of his 
career.
28
 It was reported that part of his attraction for his followers stems from his 
impoverished background, and he also moved from his leader Wang Shilin to Wu 
Yazhong, because Wang threw in his lot with the Qing government, whereas Wu 
continued to fight against the Qing court.  
 
Decade of Glory (1873-1885) 
 While most writers like Wang Zhaoliang, Wu Weiguo and Ma Gengcun and 
Tr!n V"n Giáp mentioned some events from the years 1860s to 1873, for most part, 
their accounts of this period are characterised by a lack of interest and/or knowledge. 
One of the more popular episodes involves mention of his defeat of the White Hmong 
in L#c Yên Châu, an episode that made him known to the Vietnamese emperor. The 
function of the above was no different from scattered events in his earlier career, that 
is, it functioned to advance the plot. In an extreme instance of a stark gap between his 
early years and his decade of glory, historian of China, Ella Laffey simply omits this 
period, making a transition from his early years (ending in 1860s), as covered in her 




 Due to the events that led to his rise in fame, i.e. his success at thwarting 
French adventures up the Red River, scholars cover this period in great detail. A few 
events prove to be the writers’ favourites. A first writers’ favourite involve Francis 
Garnier’s premature end. They often narrate this period vividly, with no detail too 
trivial to spare. For example, Wang, Wu and Ma start their narrative from the point 
that Liu agreed to T$ %&c’s request for aid, detailing his brilliant strategies for 
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dealing with the French, and how it succeeded spectacularly despite the odds being 
against him.
30
 Their enthusiasm in describing the battle between Liu and Garnier was 
also found in their narration of the fight beteen Henri Riviére and Liu. No effort was 
spared in their description of how Liu decided to camp near C!u Gi", hidden from 
view, and how he ambushed Riviére when Riviére’s troops passed through that point. 
In these biographies, little is written about Liu’s failures. According to his various 
contemporaries like Tang Jingsong, they had also played important roles in resisting 
the Sino-French War. Also, when faced with a determined French force, Liu also 
chose to retreat and preserve the strength of his troops, rather than witness the 
annihilation of his personal army. Naturally, success is not the only marker of Liu’s 
career, but nevertheless, most Chinese and Vietnamese scholars regard him as a 
symbol of success in Chinese and Vietnamese anti-imperialism efforts. Although 
there were both successes and failures in the skirmishes during the Sino-French War 
(1884-1885), these scholars often absolve him of all blame, preferring to employ the 
familiar trope of how dovish officials on both sides of the border undermined 
successful anti-imperialism endeavours.  
 
Encore Performance (1894) 
 After moving back to China in 1885, narratives on Liu enter into another dark 
age, as writers detail little about his life. Mai provides some sketchy details about his 
peripatetic behaviour, whereby he moves from town to town, before eventually re-
settling in Qinzhou, near where he was born.
31
 However, scholars like Giáp, and to a 
greater extent, Henry McAleavy and Laffey, deem this period to be of no importance, 
given that the latter group of scholars, Liu was merely a tool of the Qing imperial 
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government, and hence, his individual life is of no importance. Therefore, the moment 
he fades out of the limelight, there is no reason to examine his life any further.
32
 
 However, scholars reignite their interest in his activities when he participated 
in the Sino-Japanese War. Not unlike how his success against Henri Riviere was 
merely a repetition of the tale of Garnier’s death, the way his activities in the Sino-
Japanese War were narrated appear to be a repeat of how the Sino-French War was 
narrated, though this time, the battlefield was in Formosa (present-day Taiwan). Mai 
tells a gripping tale of his heroism, which contrasted starkly with the cowardice of 
both Tang Jingsong, and governor of the Liang Guang in the 1880s) and the dovish 
Qing officials. Undermined once again by these officials, Liu was forced to retreat, 
even though he won the hearts of the people of Formosa, and their desire to fight to 




A Hero to the End (1895-1917) 
 Following this last military conflict, scholars retire him permanently, though 
they still supply a few episodes, as a means of concluding the story of the subject. 
This narrative would usually involve his role as an aide to various nationalists, either 
in the form of kind words of encouragement to nationalists like Sun Yat-sen, or more 
tangible forms of aid like giving Phan B!i Châu a secure passage back to Vietnam.
34
 
In short, it serves to reinforce his bona fide credentials as a patriot, nationalist, or 
proto-Marxist leader. 
                                                
32
 Henry McAleavy, Black Flags in Vietnam: The Story of a Chinese Intervention (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1968); Laffey, “Chinese Provincial Officials and the Black Flag Army”; Shao Xunzheng, !"
#$%&'( [Sino-French-Vietnamese Relations] (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1985). 
33
 Mai, Black Flag Army. 
34
 David Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885-1925 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1971), p. 134. 
  53 
 In breaking up Liu Yongfu’s life into stages in this manner, evidently, a key 
concern of these works is upon shedding light on the nation-state, and issues 
concerning the nation-state. Some of these issues include episodes of glory in the 
nation-state’s history, for instance, its successes in the anti-imperialism struggle. Due 
to concerns with the nation-state, hence, writers use cookie cutters to interpret his 
actions, be it in “national” terms or in “class” terms. Various scholars have argued 
that “national” concerns or “class” concerns motivated him, and narrate various 
episodes to supplement this view. For instance, Mai Zhaofeng, who styles Liu as a 
successful example of Chinese culture, uses episodes that illustrate Liu’s possession 
of Chinese values like righteousness and filial piety. Due to the above, Mai suggests 
that Liu Yongfu’s other name, Liu Er (Liu the second) was given to him, because 
when pronounced in Cantonese, it sounds like Liu Yi (Liu the righteous) in 
Cantonese. This suggested his peers’ impression of him from young. These episodes 
intersperse his biography, in his early years, and during years when there are gaps. 
They serve to reinforce the constructed image, and suggest that he had some political 
ideologies that governed his life from beginning to the end. In effect, the way they 
have described Liu’s motivations is perhaps a better reflection of their own agendas.  
 
LIVING IN THE SINO-VIETNAMESE BORDER REGION: THE 
CASE OF LIU YONGFU 
 The following section attempts to address Liu Yongfu’s portrayal by his 
previous biographers.  It situates Liu Yongfu within his temporal and spatial context, 
and re-examines his motivations within this context. In other words, it attempts to 
examine the relationship between human agency and context – how Liu Yongfu (and 
others like him) lived in the Sino-Vietnamese border region in the nineteenth century. 
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Some of the themes that will be highlighted include social unrest due to the temporal 
and spatial context, and pragmatism and contingency as factors in human agency. I 
illustrate the above through a re-examination of a few key episodes in his life 
discussed previously, and in doing so, I hope to challenge the ‘social biography’ 
approach of some of his previous biographers and in the process, recover some of Liu 
Yongfu’s agency, while shedding light on life in the Sino-Vietnamese border region 
in the nineteenth century. 
  
The Sino-Vietnamese Border Region in the Nineteenth Century 
 In the previous chapter, a historical overview of the Sino-Vietnamese border 
region suggests that it is a natural region, i.e. it is physically distinct from the 
surrounding regions, by nature of physical relief. While the mountainous nature of 
this region made it hard to administer for various governments through the centuries, 
nevertheless, this area was of interest due to its resources. Gold, silver, medicinal 
herbs were some of the precious resources available in this area due to its relief.  
 Apart from being a natural physical region, it was also populated by a 
different group of people. While Han and Kinh people populated the rest of China and 
Vietnam respectively, different groups inhabited this region, and they include, Nung, 
Thái, Tay, amongst others. In short, this was a highly diverse region. This presented a 
second challenge to central governance, which the Han and Kinh dominated. 
Collectively, this made the region fairly unattractive to administer, and circumstances 
determined the extent of governance in these areas. In times of stability, it might have 
been governed, due to desire for spreading the administrative reach, which was 
backed by the ability to do so. But at other times, local politics came to the forefront, 
when the imperial houses had troubles of their own. While the previous chapter 
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discussed local politics of the Vi!t B"c, the following discusses the broader context of 
the Sino-Vietnamese border region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, leading 
to the rise of local politics in the Vi!t B"c. 
 To start the story of Liu Yongfu, it is perhaps important to look at the era and 
area that he grew up in, namely Qinzhou in particular, and Liangguang in general. 
Constituting a natural region that was cut off from the rest of China by a chain of 
mountains, and lying in the extreme south, the Liangguang was brought firmly under 
Han rule only during the Tang dynasty, when it was settled by military farm colonies. 
Even then, central administration was limited: the central bureaucracy administered 
the southern and eastern sections, while Han advisers aiding tribal chiefs sufficed in 
the northern and western sections of Liangguang.
35
 
In the mid-seventeenth century, China experienced a change in the ruling 
house. As the Qing triumphed in China, the Ming moved south, and with remaining 
forces retreating across the sea to establish a stronghold in Formosa. Although this 
last bastion of opposition was eventually pacified, the Qing came to regard “the 
coastal region as an area where disturbances might erupt at any time.”
36
 Due to the 
Qing government’s perception of the coastal region as an area that could not be 
policed, they chose to retreat from it. This proved conducive to the rise of piracy in 
coastal China, in particular in coast of Liangguang, which occurred towards the end-
eighteenth century. While piracy was a temporary occupation for fishermen looking 
to make ends meet in times of peace and relative ease, need drove greater numbers of 
people, fishermen and otherwise, to use this “survival strategy”, and the above was 
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facilitated by socio-political unrest like Triad Society uprisings in Guangdong.
37
 
Consequently, a more permanent form of piracy took shape in the establishment of a 
pirate confederation in 1789, headed first by Chen Tianpao, and later, Zhang Pao. 
With a formidable force consisting of six branches, with fleets from seventy to three 
hundred vessels, this confederation was able to monopolise the sea-lanes between 
from Hu! in central Vietnam to Leizhou Peninsula in Guangdong, taxing most 
seafaring vessels plying these routes. While Qinzhou—where Liu Yongfu grew up—
was geographically peripheral to the pirates’ headquarters in Jiangping, nevertheless, 
its port was part of the pirates’ coastal world, and it also supplied manpower, along 
with other cities of western Guangdong like Shicheng and Haigang.
38
 
 However, the heyday of the pirates came to an end in early 1800s, as the Qing 
imperial house set its naval force against the pirates, destroying some, with the lucky 
survivors fleeing westwards, away from the bureaucratic centre of Liangguang in 
Guangzhou. Furthermore, as aforementioned, Liangguang was a natural region, 
separated from the rest of China by a ridge. Much trade flowed through this ridge 
from Liang Guang to the rest of China. However, being a narrow ridge with few 
points for crossing, trade could be seriously disrupted, in the event of rebellion. And 
the above happened during the Taiping Rebellion, which left more than one hundred 
thousand porters and ten thousand boatmen jobless. It was into this milieu, that Liu 
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Marxist History? National History? 
 Scholars like Yang and Wu have determined that Liu was motivated by anti-
feudal sentiments, which slowly evolved towards being anti-imperialist sentiments. 
His anti-feudal sentiments were evident, when he left one of his earlier leaders, Wang 
Shilin to join Wu Yazhong, after Wang threw in his lot with the oppressive Qing 
government. This in turn motivated his actions, like his participation in the Sino-
French War and the Sino-Japanese War. While it is undeniable that some higher 
purpose also played a part in motivating Liu Yongfu, it is often overlooked that there 
is an overlap between these higher purposes and his personal interest. Also, perhaps 
some of his actions were perhaps just responses to the rapidly changing conditions in 
the Sino-Vietnamese border region. Some of these episodes include his early career 
prior to the establishment of the Black Flags, and when he struggled for power in the 
Sino-Vietnamese border region. 
 The events surrounding his early career as a small-time bandit suggests that 
pragmatism was his main driving force. Following the death of his family, with a few 
of his peers from his village for company, he reportedly set out from his village, in 
search of the nearest local gang leader, who settled in the nearest town. Not all 
members of the group made the journey, as halfway from their home village, three 
members of his travelling group decided that it was “too far” and returned to their 
home village.
40
 With his remaining group, he joined Zheng San, who claimed to be a 
banner leader of the Heaven and Earth society. Evidently, pragmatism played a role in 
decisions of his fellow travellers, and also in Liu. When Liu first started his career as 
a small-time bandit, he moved from leader to leader with a core group of followers 
(the first among whom, are his peers from the same village). He would, however, 
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switch his alliance, usually due to pragmatic factors like the ailing fortune of his 
chosen leaders, or in other instances, because another leader proved stronger. For 
example, in the case of Zheng San, there came a point when he was unable to feed his 
followers, leading Liu to move to another leader, Wu Er.
41
 Evidently, anti-feudal 
ideals were not his only source of motivation. 
 This was not restricted to his early career, as pragmatism continued to play a 
role, even as he started to gain prominence with the Nguy!n court, and this is evident 
in two incidents in his dealings with the Nguyen court. When he first moved to L"c 
Yên Châu in Vietnam, and triumphed over the White Hmong who had established 
their base in L"c Yên Châu, Liu was not content to merely win a foothold for his own 
band. Based on his understanding of the political situation in the Sino-Vietnamese 
border region, he sent a message to the Nguy!n court to announce his ‘service’ to the 
Nguy!n court. In doing so, he was able to gain some patronage from the Nguy!n 
court, thereby strengthening his relatively weak position as a newcomer to the Sino-
Vietnamese border region. 
 Self-interest also had a role to play in his famous fight against Francis Garnier. 
In 1873, his engagement against Huang Chongying had been ongoing for more than 
five years, as they both fought to better their economic opportunities in the region. In 
1873, Huang Chongying was rapidly losing ground, as he lost both Lào Cai and B#o 
Hà to Liu Yongfu. Given the situation, Huang sought out new allies, and this 
appeared in the form of Francis Garnier – who was looking for a local ally in his bid 
to control the Red River for France. Hence, in responding to the Nguy!n court’s plea 
to deal with Francis Garnier, there was also a degree of self-interest involved – and 
not merely anti-imperialist feelings as some of his biographers allege. Although ideas 
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like defending the “Vietnamese” “people” and the “Chinese” nation could have 
motivated him, these were not the sole sources of motivation, as there was also an 
element of self-interest.  
This chapter continues from the previous chapter on the Sino-Vietnamese 
border region, by introducing the human element, in the form of Liu Yongfu – one of 
its inhabitants in the nineteenth century. Through his relatively well-documented life, 
it briefly shows how life was like in a region that was separate from its surrounding 
areas. However, due to the lack of an appreciation of context, his experiences have 
been analyzed through the lenses of national history. To counter this trend, I examine 
his context, and explore his life and his agency, and how his life did not fit neatly into 
the moulds of national. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF LIU YONGFU 
 
 The previous two chapters have given a historical overview of the time and 
place that Liu Yongfu lived in, and a glimpse into the historical Liu Yongfu. This 
chapter focuses on the politics of history writing. Following his death in 1917, apart 
from a few publications, there was little immediate interest in him until the 1950s. 
Starting from the 1950s, there was growing interest amongst PRC and DRV historians 
in him. This chapter examines why he was important to Chinese and Vietnamese 
historians, and what it can reveal about their respective historiographical agendas. 
 This chapter begins with a genealogy of works on him up until the 1950s. An 
examination of these works suggests that there was little interest in him due to the 
context of the pre-1950s period, where political turmoil in China and Vietnam meant 
that history writing took a backseat. In my introduction, I have already covered the 
materials that are available on Liu Yongfu. This chapter, however, goes into a more 
in-depth discussion of the sources that PRC and DRV historians have mainly used. I 
then give a historical overview of the events that led to interest in him. Majority of 
this chapter will focus on the burgeoning literature on him from the 1950s. It 
examines some of the concerns that are common to both DRV and PRC historians, the 
impact of historiographic tradition on their understanding of him, and where they 
diverge. Lastly, I conclude with some observations about the current status of Liu 
Yongfu in the SRV and the PRC. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate how various 
forces like the weight of historiographical tradition, but more importantly, 
contemporary concerns of scholars influence the writing of history of his life.  
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PRE-1950 LITERATURE ON LIU YONGFU 
 Liu Yongfu’s early appearance in print material was not promising to the 
promotion of his later popularity with scholars. Secondary literature on him also 
developed separately in Vietnam and China. In China, his exploits in the Sino-French 
War and Sino-Japanese War were reported as important events in China’s first daily, 
Shenbao (!"), which was based in Shanghai, and had a wide readership in the 
Yangzi delta and other treaty ports starting from the late nineteenth century. But apart 
from Shenbao, he did not feature in other print materials. The material for secondary 
literature on him can however be traced to an act of self-promotion in his old age. 
Following his retirement from active service, he engaged local literatus, Huang Haian 
(#$%) and dictated his autobiography to him. The oral autobiography eventually 
led to some interest in him, but this interest was limited due to the context of the pre-
1950s. 
 The early twentieth century was a period of political and cultural turmoil for 
China. As the tussle between the Kuomintang (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) took the forefront, scholarship was given free rein and not subordinated to the 
agendas of political parties. Additionally, given China’s humiliation at the hands of 
various imperialist powers, like the British and the Japanese, there were many 
questions about Chinese culture’s role in causing the weakness of China in face of 
imperialism. As a consequence of the threats to Chinese culture, prominent early-
twentieth century Chinese intellectuals like Yan Fu wrote articles assessing the 
relevance of Chinese culture in face of Western civilisation.
1
 Perhaps due to the above, 
secondary literature from China on Liu Yongfu in the pre-1950s displayed continuity 
in history writing in China. Luo Xianglin’s Draft Biography of Liu Yongfu, and Li 
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Jianer’s Biography of Liu Yongfu are within the traditional genre of biography,
2
 and a 
central theme that unites these two works is their celebration of Chinese culture, 
through the achievements of Liu Yongfu. By explicating on Liu Yongfu’s successes 
against imperialism, they show that Chinese culture was still capable of producing 
heroes in the advent of Western civilisation.  
Both Luo’s Draft Biography of Liu Yongfu and Li’s Biography of Liu Yongfu 
have depended heavily on the autobiography edited by Huang Haian. They were 
written to make the material more accessible than Huang’s text, and focused on his 
achievements. Huang Haian’s autobiography of Liu Yongfu was not published by a 
press, but was a primary document in the document set Sino-French War. Li’s 
Biography of Liu Yongfu published in 1940 in Changsha, was republished in Taipei in 
1970 and later published again in 1977. In Li’s preface, he claims that his casual 
acquaintance with Liu Yongfu supplemented his biography of the Black Tiger 
general.
3
 Unlike Huang Haian’s autobiography, whereby there were little breaks in 
the narration, Li tried to break down the biography into significant episodes, and 
focused on these episodes, and in particular, Liu’s battles. Luo’s Draft Biography of 
Liu Yongfu, was first published in Shanghai in 1947, and later republished in Taipei in 
1957. Unlike Li’s rearrangement, it was a more faithful rendition of Huang’s original.  
 In sum, these two works fell within the genre of biography, and were written 
to celebrate the achievements of an individual, or in the words of Li, “the Chinese 
people’s hero” (!"#$%&).4 The context of the pre-1950s shaped these 
biographies, which tried to answer the threat to Chinese culture that came from 
China’s humiliation in face of imperialism. As someone who succeeded in killing 
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Francis Garnier and Henri Rivière, and thwarting French imperialism twice, naturally, 
Liu became a favourite subject for biographies.  
 Vietnamese secondary literature in the pre-1950s on Liu Yongfu took a 
different path from Chinese secondary literature, as Vietnam took a different path in 
history. Up until 1954, Vietnam was a French colony. This naturally had an impact on 
literature produced, and this was also true of secondary literature on the Black Tiger 
general. Responsible for the death of the French hero/martyr, French literature had a 
negative attitude towards Liu.  
 French primary accounts of Liu Yongfu were mainly negative. French 
merchant, Jean Dupuis, who met Liu during his exploration of the commercial 
viability of the Red River from 1872 to 1873, suggested that Liu was at least 
interested in acquainting with Dupuis, if not welcoming him. This is in stark contrast 
with Liu’s image as an anti-French imperialism hero. For example, Dupuis mentions 
that he had heard of “the famous rebels with Black Flags who have established 
themselves in Lao-kai”, but when they arrive in Lào Cai, instead of being repelled, 
“[t]hey (the Black Flags) receive us by firing a few rifles shots … then they present 
me with a pig and a goat; they also provide us with coolies.” It appears that Liu’s 
welcoming attitude towards Dupuis was an attempt to get into Dupuis’ good books (at 
least from Dupuis’ perspective), as Dupuis states that “[t]hey (the Black Flags) know 
very well that their reign of robbery will not last long once the river is open to trade 
with Yunnan, but what can we do, since they are not the strongest?”. Additionally, 
due to Liu’s rivalry with the Yellow Flags, which had an impact on Lào Cai, “[t]he 
traders abandoned the city by selling off their merchandise at any price … [t]hus the 
market of Lao-kai is deserted today.”
5
 While Dupuis’ comments on Liu were mild, his 
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fellow-countryman P. Neis who visited Lào Cai a decade later, was scathing in his 
criticisms of Liu, whom he described as a mercenary with penchant for arson. 
According to Neis, Liu “only let the richest merchants take shelter in it [Lào Cai] and 
made them pay dearly for his protection.” The above was not his only source of 
income, as protection from arson can only be “bought from him with gold”.
6
  
The mindset of Dupuis and Neis was probably a reflection of French colonial 
attitudes, which classified all who opposed them as bandits and rebels. This was also 
seen in secondary literature during the French colonial period. For instance, 
Alexander Poucouroille wrote a fictional novel based on him, whereby he was a 
feared bandit.
7
 The only known Vietnamese writer who examined Liu Yongfu during 
the French colonial period appears to have adopted an attitude similar to the French 
colonial regime. In Nguy!n V"n Bân’s Gi!c C" #en (Black Flag Bandit), Bân 
adopted the French attitude towards “bandits”, and reviled Liu Yongfu. He pointed 
out that Liu “was pillaging Tonkin, and it was only through the intervention of the 
French that he was stopped”.
8
 A pro-French account, Bân asserts that ever since the 
former Taiping Heavenly Kingdom troops of Liu Yongfu took over control of Vi#t 
B$c, it has caused tears to the peoples like the M%&ng and Mán living there.9 V"n Tân, 
one of the DRV writers who were part of the renewed discussion on Liu Yongfu in 
Nghiên C$u L%ch S& [Historical Research] posits Bân’s text was just a French 
imperialist tool “intended to divide the people of Vietnam and China.”
10
  
 A departure from the above examples is respected Vietnamese scholar Tr'n 
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Tr!ng Kim, whose account of Liu appears to favour his actions in Vietnam. Tr"n 
Tr!ng Kim’s highly regarded Vi!t Nam S" L#$c [History of Vietnam] is the first 
modern history of Vietnam. Liu Yongfu appears in Kim’s comprehensive survey in 
the chapters on French colonisation of B#c K$. Athough Kim’s account of Liu’s role 
in history employs a factual narration of events that have occurred – much alike the 
rest of Kim’s writing style, his usage of terms like “resisting the French” (ch%ng gi& 
quân Pháp) suggests that he acknowledged Liu’s help towards Vietnam. .
11
  
 Secondary literature in the pre-1950s on the Black Tiger General took 
different trajectories in China and Vietnam, due to the very different contexts in 
which they arose. In China, due to a lack of political unity, and secondary literature 
on him tended to follow the traditional genre of biography, and he was given such 
attention, as he was China’s answer to threats to its culture from imperialism, given 
his successes in anti-imperialism. In Vietnam, which was a French colony right up to 
1954, colonial attitudes towards figures of dissent like Liu Yongfu also found its way 
into secondary literature. Even though Tr"n Tr!ng Kim had a favourable opinion of 
Liu Yongfu, it appeared muted; Kim’s opinion of Liu was only revealed through his 
choice of words. This, however, changed following the 1950s, whereby Chinese and 
Vietnamese secondary literature on him found common ground, but concomitantly, 
there were sufficient differences between the two to highlight issues that the two 
countries grappled with. 
 
POST-1950 LITERATURE ON LIU YONGFU 
Following the founding of both the PRC and the DRV in 1949 and 1945 
respectively, there was also a radical change in the process of knowledge production.  
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As communist regimes, there are some features common to their scholarship, as both 
the PRC and the DRV were now concerned with examining peasant rebellions in their 
history. As Feuerwerker neatly puts it, “Great revolutions naturally try to 
revolutionize the history of the era which preceded them. This is especially true of a 
Communist-led revolution which believes in using history as a political tool.”
12
 
Moving away from the elite focus of imperial Vietnamese and Chinese historiography, 
both Vietnamese and Chinese historians now turn their focus to the lower social 
classes like peasants, particularly peasant movements.  
The drive to re-write history had an impact on post-1950s secondary literature 
on Liu Yongfu. Discussions on Liu Yongfu in both the PRC and DRV were now 
concerned with their subject’s peasant background and the issues of oppression. This 
was the common ground shared by both the PRC and the DRV. A second common 
feature of PRC and DRV scholarship on him, was their interest in his role in anti-
imperialism. While scholars from the PRC and the DRV shared some common 
ground, nevertheless, Liu Yongfu was not an entirely comfortable topic for the latter. 
This section will address reasons for this change in secondary literature from the 
1950s, its relation to scholarship trends in the PRC and the DRV. In doing so, I 
examine the politics of history writing. 
 
A Vietnamese People’s Hero (1950s-1962)? 
From the 1950s, there was a radical change in secondary literature on Liu 
Yongfu. Following the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945, 
the DRV started producing their scholarship. Marxism’s role in the DRV also 
extended to the writing of history, and DRV historians became increasingly 
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concerned about the issue of whether Liu Yongfu was a peasant leader. The DRV also 
sought to integrate pre-colonial history into the DRV writing of history, and this was 
evident in its attempt to highlight themes in Vietnamese history. On such theme was 
the fierce anti-foreign resistance of the Vietnamese. And lastly, due to the complex 
Sino-Vietnamese relationship, DRV scholarship also attempted to carve out a national 
space for themselves, vis-à-vis the Chinese. These trends were evident in post-1950s 
Vietnamese secondary literature on Liu. 
DRV scholarship sought to counter these colonial perceptions of Liu as a 
bandit, and Liu's historiographical rehabilitation began with Tr!n V"n Giàu in Ch!ng 
Xâm L"ng [Resisting the Invasion]. In narrating his role in Vietnamese history, only 
positive terms were used to describe his actions - a far cry from contemporary French 
accounts. First, instead of using the bandit, Giàu refers to Liu respectfully by his title, 
“Governor Liu”. He also had more laudatory terms to describe Liu. Giàu gives an 
instance of how Liu’s resolute defense of Vietnam thwarted Li Hongzhang’s plans of 
ceding Vietnam to the French. In his commentary of Liu’s actions, he wrote that Liu 
“was not only a great general, but also great (Confucian) gentleman (#$i tr%&ng 
phu).”
13
 Unlike Kim, whose opinion of Liu was more subtle, Giàu was unabashed in 
his praise for the Black Tiger General. In writing about Liu’s contributions to the 
deaths of Garnier and Rivière, Giàu praised Liu for his “extraordinary contributions 
(l'p k( công)” to Vietnam.14   
Following Giàu’s lead, Tr!n V"n Giáp’s L#u V$nh Phúc: T#%ng C& 'en [Liu 
Yongfu: Leader of the Black Flags] published in 1958 continued to portray him in a 
positive light. On the outset, Giáp was compelled to exonerate Liu from his “bandit” 
label. This is evident from his choice of subtitle. In contrast to Nguy)n V"n Bân, who 
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labelled him “the Black Flag bandit”, Giáp labels him “General of the Black Flags – 
A Taiping Soldier in Vietnam”. The latter is evidently more flattering than the former. 
Here, he suggested that the bad press was a French feudal ploy to diminish Liu’s 
achievements, because his achievements were essentially an obstacle to imperialism – 
specifically, the colonisation of Vietnam. While majority of the events covered in his 
book on Liu closely follow majority of the narrated events in the previous chapter, it 
is pertinent to point out that to Giáp, Liu was important for two reasons: first, his 
defeat of Garnier and Rivière which “resulted in the first two greatest French defeats 
in Vietnam”; second, he was illustrative of “healthy peasant class struggle for 
liberation in that era”.
15
 The latter was a major theme in Giáp’s works, as it is 
repeatedly emphasised at different points, as he follows Liu’s life chronologically. He 
points out Liu’s peasant-class birth, and his further integration in to the class through 
his upbringing. Furthermore, his family “never had anything to do with the feudal 
system”.
16
 Essentially, the two reasons that made Liu important to Giáp were 
interdependent, “it was a just war. A just war will always be victorious, as it enjoys 
the support of all people”.
17
 Writing within a new historical context that focused on 
the lower social classes, and from a Vietnamese historical consciousness that glorified 
success against foreign invasion, Liu’s quality of being a peasant, and achievement of 
winning the first war against the French made him a DRV historian’s darling.  
Giàu’s mention, and Giáp’s book certainly attracted the attention of their 
fellow historians in the DRV. In February 1961, the premier journal of historical 
research in the DRV, Historical Research identified Liu Yongfu as one of the 
historical personages to be assessed, alongside some other historical figures like H! 
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Qu! Ly (1336-1407), the founder of the short-lived Ho dynasty, who was disgraced as 
an usurper, and Phan Chu Trinh (1872-1926), one of Liu’s acquaintances, and 
considered to be one of Vietnam’s first nationalists. In the case of the former, 
Vietnamese historians were interested in assessing “if his reforms brought an 
improvement” and assessing it in a manner that considers the historical context, and 
does not focus solely on his class background or his usurpation of a “legitimate” 
dynasty. In other words, they were interested in accessing his contributions to 
“Vietnam”, despite his background as the ruling feudal class. For Phan Chu Trinh, 
historians were interested in his contributions to anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism, 
despite his reformist tendency and initial willingness to accept French rule as an 
instrument of change.  
Such assessments of historical figures who “were ambiguous and could not be 
characterized with ease” were part of the postcolonial history writing process, which 
dealt with other problems such as national origins. The process of (re)assessment 
itself was also intended to be a part of the undertaking of writing a new Vietnamese 
history, as “aiming for consensus, new institutions and new habits undermined 
colonial and bourgeois ideas of authorship.”
18
 In the case of Liu Yongfu, some of the 
questions that the editors raised with regards to Liu Yongfu are, “What is the correct 
way of assessing (the Black Flag army)? When the Black Flag army fought with our 
army against the French, what was their political stance, or their motives? Why did a 
peasants’ army of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom movement degenerate into local 
bandits, ruling places through separatism, in hostility towards the people?”
19
 In short, 
there were two key issues that caused DRV historians discomfort. The first were 
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claims of Liu Yongfu’s banditry and the misery that his banditry caused for its his 
victims. And a second less obvious but equally important issue, was the extent of his 
links to China. In the context of tenuous Sino-Vietnamese relations and Vietnamese 
discomfort with Chinese influence on Vietnamese history, DRV historians have 
attempted to divorce Liu from his Chinese origins, by pointing out that his Chinese 
compatriots like Tang Jingsong were constantly trying to undermine him. This 
suggests that they felt his rightful place was in Vietnam.  
Liu Yongfu’s banditry was a key issue, due to its implications. Liu’s main feat 
was his success against Garnier and Riviere, who were symbols of imperialism – the 
high point of capitalism. If his banditry were proven to be true, it would detract from 
his status as a symbol of anti-imperialism.
20
  
Generally, majority of the DRV historians sided with Giáp, and absolved him 
of accusations of banditry, but this was not without some dissent. Nguy!n V"n Nhân 
took pains to investigate claims of Liu’s banditry by conducting fieldwork in some of 
the villages that alleged suffered from his pillaging. Through oral interviews, he 
ascertained that there was truth behind these claims. The notoriety of the Black Flags 
reportedly remained some twenty to thirty years after they left, whereby in more 
recent times, “young men who take liberties with women” are referred to as “Black 
Flag army”.
21
 However, Nhân’s conclusion that the Black Flag did indeed plunder in 
the places they went by led other DRV historians to try and defend Liu Yongfu. Tr#n 
Huy Li$u, in his concluding remarks to close the discussion on Liu, had this opinion 
of his reported acts of plunder and pillage: 
A friend explained: The Black Flag army did violate the property and lives of 
some Vietnamese, but it is perhaps targeted against landlords, reactionaries, 
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but not against the Vietnamese people in general.
22
  
Other scholars offered their own explanation to the phenomenon. One posited that in 
the mayhem, victims probably could not tell the difference between the Black flags, 
and other bands roaming around the region. Another posited that even if it were the 
Black flags, it might not have been the ones directly under the control of Liu Yongfu. 
Therefore, there was no way he could have known about it, and had a part in it. In 
sum, Nhân’s conclusions were overruled by the majority, who absolved Liu of all 
accusations.  
 After arriving at the conclusion that he was not responsible for the plunder and 
pillage, DRV historians were then able to declare that he was a leader of peasant-
struggle who was victorious against an imperialist foreign aggression. This was in line 
with scholarship by DRV scholars of this period, who regarded the “spirit of 
resistance against foreign aggression” as the national essence of the Vietnamese 
nation, and also valued the participation of “the people”.
23
   
 There was, however, still some discomfort among the DRV scholars. 
Discussions about Liu Yongfu were written at a time when scholars were debating 
how they were to create a “Vietnamese (national) space” vis-à-vis China. Such 
discussions extended to various fields, including literature. In the example of 
literature, discussion was centered on accessing if there was “Vietnamese” literature, 
given the strong influence of “Chinese” culture on “Vietnamese” culture. This made it 




To deal with the above, DRV historians found ways to divorce Liu from his 
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“Chinese” identity. !"ng Huy V#n attempted to do so, by pointing out the tense 
relations that Liu had with Chinese officials like Tang Jingsong stationed at the border; 
while Thâu and H$ng tried to style him as a peasant warrior, in an attempt to make 
him universal, rather than uniquely “Chinese”.
25
 Although they were proud of his 
pedigree as a Taiping soldier, there was a greater focus on his activities in Vietnam, 
particularly, his anti-foreign resistance. As he was associated with anti-foreign 
resistance – a recurring theme in Vietnamese historiography – therefore, Vietnamese 
historians were able to domesticate Liu the symbol by placing him within a longer 
Vietnamese historical tradition, alike other symbols of Vietnamese resistance like the 
Tr%ng sisters. 
In conclusion, a study of secondary literature on Liu Yongfu provides insight 
into DRV historiography, and some of their concerns. These include their interest in a 
new understanding of their history, their concern with anti-imperialism, and their need 
for a national space vis-à-vis the Chinese. 
 
Chinese Hero? Peasant Hero? – Ambiguity in the PRC (1980s-1990s) 
 Interest in Liu Yongfu in the PRC, however, took a while to catch on, and the 
origins of this interest can probably be traced to the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, 
where he was often cited as a figure of former warm ties between China and Vietnam. 
In Bradley Davis’ introduction to his thesis, he cites Rewi Alley, who criticised the 
Vietnamese leadership for betraying the friendship of the Chinese and Vietnamese 
peoples, represented by “the tough fight put up by the Black Flags in defense of 
Vietnam.”
26
 While direct linkage between the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, and 
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interest in Liu Yongfu cannot be firmly established, there was a marked increase in 
interest in him. Prior to 1979, there were few or no publications in the PRC on him.  
 As mentioned above, following the founding of the PRC, there was also a 
departure from the past in the process of knowledge production. A key feature is the 
call to “!"#$” (emphasize the present and de-emphasize the past). In other words, 
the study of history is to serve present-day political needs. As a departure from earlier 
Chinese historiography that concerned itself with ‘big’ men like emperors, there is 
now a shift in focus to “the historical struggles of the labouring masses”.
27
 While the 
Sino-Vietnamese War was the probable reason for new interest in him, scholarship on 
him heavily reflected the main concerns of PRC historiography and its trends.  
 PRC historiography’s concerns arose out of historical circumstances. Due to 
imperialist threats to China’s sovereignty from the mid-nineteenth century, one such 
theme was patriotism. The above two points were often related, as patriotism was 
linked to anti-imperialism. This was a feature of Chinese communist historiography, 
which often had to grapple with “class viewpoint” and nationalism.
28
 Discussions 
about Liu Yongfu mirrored these trends in PRC historiography. 
 Therefore there was a great deal of interest in Yongfu’s background, and the 
formation of the Black Flag Army. As discussed in Chapter 3, studies of his early life 
were not only important, because historiography is generally interested in the early 
life of heroes, but also because PRC historiographers use this stage to firmly establish 
that he is part of the peasant class. Two excellent biographers, Yang Wanxiu and Wu 
Zhihui preface their study, Critical Biography of Liu Yongfu by pointing out that he 
was worth examining, as his life allowed greater understanding of the nature of 
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people’s uprising.
29
 Like Yang and Wu, some of his earliest biographers in the PRC, 
Wang Zhaoliang, Liang Weiguo and Ma Gengcun devoted part of their study to Liu 
Yongfu’s tumultuous childhood, and the process by which he formed his anti-feudal, 
peasant army. They point out that the indirect responsibility of a landlord for the death 
of his parents led him to sympathise with the poor, and also pushed him to join the 
various bands roaming the Liangguang region.
30
  
 Indeed, this interest in his background, and the nature of his activities is by no 
means superficial, and his possible aberrations from a model peasant leader are 
addressed seriously. One such controversial episode that Yang and Wu discussed in 
detail occurred during his early struggle to gain ascendancy in the Sino-Vietnamese 
borderlands. In Liu’s early career, he often double-crossed his former leaders. Two 
victims of his betrayal were Zheng San and Wang Shilin. As a peasant leader, PRC 
scholars have imbued him with noble qualities. His activities during this stage of his 
life, however, have resulted in a dent in his integrity. In order to keep his image as a 
hero intact, Yang and Wu argued that his former leaders, Zheng San and Wang Shilin 
have sold out to the imperial court, and embraced feudalism once again. Therefore, 
Liu was not only justified in his betrayal of them, but at the same time, he was also 
motivated by feelings of anti-feudalism. This made his actions justifiable.
31
  
Yang and Wu’s interest in his political motivations are not confined to his 
more controversial activities; they also have a keen interest in his political ideology. 
In their biography, they trace the progression of Liu’s political ideology. This was a 
grey area that his biographers had to grapple with in their study. While his peasant 
background made him a reactionary who was anti-feudal and anti-imperialist, his 
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actions suggest that when given the opportunity, he was willing with work the feudal 
class. Yang and Wu had to ascribe that to peasant tendencies to look up to authority, 
and in this case, it was the monarchy, in order to explain his willingness to work with 
the Chinese and Vietnamese imperial houses. His status as a reactionary who was 
willing to work with the monarchy was a cause for concern. Therefore, it is with 
satisfaction that the two writers note how Liu ‘improved’ towards the end of his life, 
as he gave up his belief in the monarchy, and joined Sun Yat-sen’s Tong Meng Hui, 
serving as a local official in the Republic of China.
32
 The great interest in him is very 
much in line with the greater emphasis on studies of peasants
33
 
 Beyond discussions of Liu Yongfu’s anti-feudalism, there is greater interest in 
his role in anti-imperialism. This refers to his involvement in the Sino-French War 
and the Sino-Japanese War. Due to his successes against the French, PRC historians 
are as enthusiastic as their Vietnamese counterparts about this episode. Wang, Liang, 
and Ma used fourteen out of the eighteen chapters in their book for descriptions of the 
military engagements that Liu participated in, ranging from successful battles in 
Vietnam to dogged resistance in Formosa.
34
 While Wang, Liang, and Ma’s heavy 
focus on the Sino-French War and the Sino-Japanese is an extreme example, their 
keen interest in the above events is central to all biographies of Liu Yongfu.  
 In the above, while there is some interest in his contributions to anti-
imperialism, the focus on anti-imperialist aspect of Liu Yongfu’s contributions also 
cannot be separated from the strong interest in patriotism and concern about Chinese 
sovereignty. Although most of these events took place in Vietnam, Chinese scholars 
regarded French aggression against their former vassal as a threat to their sovereignty. 
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While both Vietnamese and Chinese historians similarly gave lengthy descriptions of 
his anti-imperialism efforts, a difference between the two is the latter’s emphasis is 
Liu’s Chinese identity. One such writer is Chen Lizhong (!"#), who placed great 
emphasis on his Chinese identity. For instance, Chen claimed that while Liu defended 
Vietnam, his foremost concern was with China. He suggested that Liu defended 
Vietnam, because it was China’s neighbour, and any threats to Vietnam would 
naturally translate into a threat to Chinese sovereignty.
35
 Chen’s logic certainly has a 
long tradition in Chinese history, whereby mandarins in the Qing court were 
particularly concerned with China’s border with Vietnam, due to the security threat it 
posed.
36
 Chen’s emphasis on Liu’s identity, however, suggests that the issue of 
Chinese sovereignty also motivated PRC scholars. Therefore, there was an emphasis 
in Chen’s biography that Liu Yongfu was one of the few Chinese who was successful 
against the West’s attempt to encroach on Chinese sovereignty in the nineteenth 
century.
37
 In doing so, Chen was echoing the concerns of some earlier PRC historians.  
 A last feature of Liu Yongfu’s biographies that showed the impact of PRC 
historiography is a matter of style. Lastly, while Yang and Wu’s biography of Liu 
Yongfu was excellent, other biographers did not match the quality of their work. Due 
to the need to produce multiple volumes of instructional value within short notice for 
popular consumption, several of his biographies were alike Mai’s biography – 
engaging, employs themes that were easy to identify with, and did not emphasize on 
historical veracity. Two such volumes are Chen Lizhong’s $%&'()*+,-
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!"# [The Pride of Chinese Culture: Black Flag General Liu Yongfu].
38
 Chen’s 
volume was part of a larger series “Hundred Tales of the Chinese Spirit”, which 
celebrates Chinese heroes. A common narrative technique of such volumes is to focus 
on a big event that an individual is involved in, and elaborate on the contributions of 
the individual in the major event. Such volumes, however, are hastily produced. 
Therefore, majority of the volume will focus on the event, and there is relatively little 
on the individual. Consequently, there was little on Liu’s life, and majority of his 
volume on him focused on the Sino-French War and the Sino-Japanese War, since 
these two wars were important to China in the nineteenth century.
39
 While Liu Yongfu 
and his Black Flag Army narrates more of his life, it tends to dramatize Liu’s life, 
playing up themes like “evil imperialist plots” that would appeal to a Chinese-reading 
audience. These lively stories are supplemented by flattering pictures, which make 




DRV and PRC Historiography: A Brief Comparison 
As two communist countries writing on the same historical figure, it would 
have been logical to assume that their discussions of him should have been similar. 
This was, however, not entirely the case. Indeed, there are differences between how 
the DRV and the PRC view Liu Yongfu. This makes him a good lens to understand 
their concerns relative to each other. This section will give a brief comparison of 
DRV and PRC scholarship on him. 
The theme of anti-imperialism – the second similarity – between the PRC and 
the DRV probably has broader reverberations within Asian history. The nineteenth 
century was a century of change throughout Asia, due to the arrival of colonialism. 
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Concerns about imperialism are not confined to Marxist countries, but this was a 
broader concern. The lauding of anti-imperialist heroes can be seen not only in the 
DRV, and the PRC, but this can also be observed in the biographies of other ‘anti-
imperialist’ heroes like Bonifacio in the Philippines, and To’ Janggut in Malaysia.
41
 
Therefore, similarities in the historiography of Liu Yongfu are due to a common 
history shared by the DRV and the PRC in particular, and also due to a common 
historical experience in Asia. 
The difference in the way the DRV and the PRC scholars wrote about Liu 
Yongfu, however, highlights their respective concerns. In the DRV, there was some 
mixed reaction towards Liu Yongfu, and a strong attempt to domesticate his 
achievements within a Vietnamese context. This was tied to the DRV’s need to carve 
out a national space for themselves vis-à-vis China. Hence, the study of this figure 
common to the history of the DRV and the PRC can shed light on Vietnamese 
concerns following its independence. 
In the case of the PRC, there was little need to grapple with the status of Liu 
Yongfu. There was simple, whole-hearted acceptance of his achievements, 
particularly, his efforts and successes against foreign powers like France. This whole-
hearted acceptance is part of a greater attempt to highlight patriotism in Chinese 
culture, and he joins a line of his predecessors who have fought against foreigners. It 
was a bonus for Chinese historians that he happened to be a peasant leader as well. 
 
 RECENT SCHOLARSHIP ON LIU YONGFU 
 The historiography of Liu Yongfu in the DRV and the PRC developed in 
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response to historical conditions, like the change into communist regimes, and the 
needs of these regimes to produce new scholarship that would serve the requirements 
of their regimes. Intense as the initial interest in him, this interest also cooled off 
rapidly. This section examines the status of Liu Yongfu following these periods of 
intense interest. 
 The initial interest in Liu Yongfu was national in nature, and the attempt was 
to discuss his role in relation to the nation, and also to promote his status at a national 
level. This project, however, did not take off – he never really became a national hero 
of either the PRC or the DRV. And as the obscure figure that he initially was who was 
placed in the limelight of the national stage, he also rapidly faded from the national 
stage into obscurity when the conditions that led to interest in him were no longer 
existent. 
There are several possibilities for this trend. It is possible that broader 
historiographic trends in the SRV and the PRC also had an impact on recent works on 
Liu Yongfu. Following an intense period of national history writing, whereby scholars 
produce volumes of national history, recent historiography in both countries moves 
away from writing national histories. For instance, in the early years of the founding 
the PRC and the DRV, historians at the respective Institute of History were tasked 
with writing a definitive volume on national history. The above activity is, however, a 
thing of the past. 
 Consequent interest in Liu Yongfu is local in nature, rather than national in 
nature. Once again, the local interest in Liu Yongfu could potentially be tied to trends 
in the PRC and the SRV scholarship. In Hue-Tam Ho Tai’s edited volume on the 
contestations between state and local culture, following doi moi, deconstruction of the 
state controlled past has given space for alternative narratives to emerge, and some of 
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these are local voices. In Christoph Giebel’s study of Tôn !"c Th#ng, he observed 
that the south has used the memorial shrine dedicated to Thang to remind the north of 
contributions from southern guerillas.
42
 Similarly, in the case of Liu Yongfu, 
following the series of articles Nghiên C!u L"ch S#, national interest in him died 
down. It is only in the recent past, scholars in Lào Cai re-ignite their interest in this 
hero who lived in Lào Cai. In 2007, Nguy$n !"c Nhu% published an article on the 
Lào Cai government website on Liu Yongfu, his contributions to Lào Cai, and the 
part that Lào Cai played in Vietnamese history. In the article, Nhu% points out that 
although Lào Cai was a late addition in Vietnamese records, appearing only in the 
Nguy$n dynasty, it had a key role in to play in modern Vietnam, and this was evident 
from both French and British interest in Lào Cai, and the importance of Lào Cai to the 
endeavors of the peripatetic Liu, who made it his base. It appears that Liu is now used 
to advance the local interest of Lào Cai, in trying to assert its importance to the 
Vietnamese nation, despite its short recorded history.
43
   
 Such a phenomenon is also observed in recent PRC literature on Liu Yongfu. 
Previously, he was a subject of national importance. But in recent literature, there is 
more local interest in his importance. Local claims on Liu Yongfu are made in two 
ways. First, there is a focus on his birth province, Guangxi.
44
 Writers in Guangxi are 
now his strongest advocates, as they are now the ones who take the most interest in 
him. There are volumes published about his life and times in Shangsi, which is his 
birthplace. One example is Liu Yongfu in Shangsi. This is not the only volume. In an 
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anthology of heroes in Qinzhou, there is also one volume dedicated to him, as he 
settled in Qinzhou in his later years. This was published by the Qinzhou city 
government.  
A second way local claims are made on Liu Yongfu is the focus on his identity 
as a Hakka. In recent years, there appears to be a shift in the PRC, whereby there is 
more attention paid to the parts that make up the whole PRC. In 2004, the Institute of 
Hakka Studies was set up in the Guangxi Normal University, to make a more in-depth 
study of the Hakka people. Its agenda was to put out volumes on Hakka of the various 
regions, famous Hakka people, and Hakka practices. One such publication that was 
the product of the Institute of Hakka Studies is Zhong Wendian’s !"#$ [Hakka 
of Guangxi], which as the title suggests, focuses on the famous Hakka in Guangxi. 
One chapter of his volume is dedicated to Liu Yongfu, whom he lauds as an anti-
imperialist hero. By including him in this volume, he is now part of a wider group, 
which includes other Hakka heroes like Lee Kongchian, a prominent businessman in 
Singapore, and one of the richest men in Southeast Asia in the mid-twentieth century, 




Comparing trends between early historiography of Liu Yongfu, and recent 
historiography on him, it is evident that there is politics involved in the process of 
history writing. Early historiography on him was a result of the PRC and the DRV 
gaining their independence as communist countries. Consequently, discussions on Liu 
Yongfu emphasize on what his role can tell us about the historical stages of Marxism 
in the PRC and the DRV. Also, due to his engagement with imperialism and 
colonialism, his actions are also assessed in relation to the above. As these are 
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national concerns, his actions were discussed on a national sphere. 
While he is no longer discussed in relation to national concerns given that 
these national concerns are no longer as relevant, recent historiography on him is also 
part of the larger contestation between national narratives and local claims. Once 
again, local scholars attempt to stake their claim on him as their local hero, the same 
way earlier scholarship attempted to co-opt him as their peasant hero or anti-colonial 
hero. Hence, his new identity as a Hakka hero, Guangxi hero, or Lào Cai hero is also 
part of the politics of history writing. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
 My interest in Liu Yongfu began, when he made fleeting appearances in 
general histories of the region. In David Marr’s Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885-
1925, he evidently had an important role in nineteenth century East Asian history, as 
he was linked to several important figures like Vietnamese nationalists Phan B!i 
Châu and Phan Chu Trinh, and events like the Sino-French War and the Sino-
Japanese War. Despite his centrality to some of these events, there were few studies 
in the English language that were devoted to him. This led to my thesis on him.
1
 
 Through the course of my research, I realised that he was the subject of 
several biographies like Tr"n V#n Giáp’s study and Mai Zhaofeng’s study, and also 
central to other studies like Ella Laffey’s dissertation on local politics in the Chinese 
border region. Although he was central to these studies, they were more interested in 
using him to advance their own ideas – for instance, the idea that he is a “Chinese” 
hero or a “Vietnamese” hero. In other words, although they narrate the major events 
in his life, there was little attempt to contextualize their studies, and situate him in the 
appropriate time and place.  
 In order to seek out Liu Yongfu, I started my thesis with a historical overview 
of his spatial context – Vi$t B%c in the Sino-Vietnamese border region. My historical 
overview of the Vi$t B%c suggests that the Black Tiger General maximised the 
opportunities that living in the Vi$t B%c entailed, and carved a niche for himself in the 
borderlands. His approach to his environment and the opportunities that it presented 
were not different from former inhabitants of the Vi$t B%c, like Nùng Trí Cao in the 
eleventh century, and Nùng V#n Vân in the nineteenth century, to name a few of the 
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inhabitants who made themselves overlords of Vi!t B"c. By shifting the focus on Liu 
Yongfu, and attempting to contextualise him, I have explored an alternative history of 
the borderlands that does not simply prioritise the histories of the Chinese and 
Vietnamese nations, which are centered on the capitals and the “national” territories 
under their control. In doing so, I shifted the focus from a “national” narrative of Liu, 
to a “local” narrative of him.  
 Lastly, I went on to examine the disjuncture between secondary literature on 
Liu Yongfu, and his life within its historical context. As mentioned above, despite Liu 
being the main subject of these studies, his life story became subject to other master 
narratives of Vietnam and China. Nevertheless, these biographies are of interest, as 
they shed light on some of the central concerns of Vietnamese and Chinese historians. 
Some themes common to both include their concern with anti-imperialism in the 
nineteenth century. Apart from the similarities, the point of departure between 
Vietnamese and Chinese historians is also of interest – their differences suggest that 
Vietnamese historians were eager to establish a separate national space from the 
Chinese, particularly since their history was closely associated with Chinese history. 
The Black Tiger General was another subject whom they attempted to claim as their 
own. The above issues have implications for Vietnamese history.   
 In my second chapter, I argued that the Vi!t B"c was not always part of 
“Vietnam”. Indeed, its incorporation into “Vietnam” was fairly recent. At the earliest, 
this probably happened during the French colonial era. But a more plausible date was 
when Vi!t B"c gained a prominent role during the First Indochina War. The above is, 
however, overlooked in Hanoi historiography. In the words of Mã Giang Lân, it is the 
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“cradle of the Revolution”.
2
 Consequently, studies of its earlier history and its 
inhabitants repeat the theme of “solidarity and mutual aid of all comrades from the 
minority groups”.
3
 Apart from Liu Yongfu, one other Vi!t B"c inhabitant whose life 
was explained using this theme was Nùng Trí Cao. In Phan Huy Lê’s assessment of 
Cao’s activities, Lê asserts that he was symbolic as he led the Tày and Nùng peoples 
to cooperate with the Kinh to defend “Vietnam” against the foreign invasion of the 
Tang dynasty.
4
 Both my thesis and James Anderson’s study, however, suggest that 
such interpretations like the idea of multi-ethnic solidarity against a foreign aggressor, 
and the assumption of a multi-ethnic nation are not entirely applicable to the study of 
the region and its inhabitants.
5
  
The above has implications for Hanoi historiography. Following the founding 
of the DRV, Vietnamese historians were given the task of finding pre-colonial 
precedents of Vietnamese collaboration with other ethnic groups. Consequently, there 
was a need “to reimagine the past” whereby various differences, for instance, 
differences between groups and regions were obscured.
6
 My re-assessment of both 
Vi!t B"c and Liu Yongfu poses challenges to the neat assumption that his activities in 
the region were the first instance of the people of the region rising against French 
aggression in the nineteenth century. First, despite Vi!t B"c’s importance in the First 
Indochina Wars, that was probably also one of the first instance in history when Vi!t 
B"c became central to “Vietnam” as opposed to being in the margins of “Vietnam”.7 
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Vietnamese historians might have to conduct a more in-depth historical study of the 
area in its own right/outside the “national” framework, rather than simply assume that 
it was part of “Vietnam”, and had well-defined borders with “China” throughout 
history.
8
 Second, this also problematises the assessment of individuals who lived 
there. If it was not part of “Vietnam”, there is a need to re-examine their motivations 
and re-contextualise their actions, beyond classic “Vietnamese” themes of fighting 
against foreign invasion, and peasant uprisings. In short, as Vi!t B"c was not wholly 
incorporated into “Vietnam” until the very recent past, the current themes in Hanoi 
historiography are not adequate. Studies centered on the Sino-Vietnamese border 
region might be more appropriate. 
 My study of Vi!t B"c is a broad overview with the purpose of making a case 
for expanding studies on the Sino-Southeast Asian borderlands to include this part of 
the Sino-Vietnamese border region. Much research remains to be done for Vi!t B"c, 
and more broadly, the Sino-Vietnamese border region. Some possibilities for future 
research could include individuals and groups in the region, goods passing through 
the region, and prominent border towns. “Outlaws” like Nùng V#n Vân in Cao B$ng 
could be further examined, for a better understanding of how the Vi!t B"c became a 
centre in other periods.
9
 Other trans-border individuals like %èo V#n Tri – who was 
active between “Vietnam” and “Laos” – could add another dimension to studies of the 
Sino-Southeast Asian borderlands. Another possibility would be the groups who call 
this area home, and one such group is the Nùng. Liu Yongfu’s successes would not 
have been possible without the aid of his right-hand man, Nùng Tú Nghi!p, whose 
familiarity with the landscape was crucial to his endeavours.  
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 Apart from the people who lived in the region, there can be further studies of 
goods that passed through. In both Yang Bin and Giersch Patterson’s studies, tea and 
horses were two important goods in this Asian borderland. It would be interesting to 
know if Cao B!ng’s famous horses had buyers from afar, and were not just highly 
prized by the Nguy"n dynasty. Also, from the late-nineteenth to early-twentieth 
century, opium became an important good in the borderlands. Diana Lary, in her 
study of Guangxi in this period, points out that while most other routes were close to 
opium, Guangxi was still open to the traffic of opium.
10
  
 Lastly, another possibility for future research would be prominent border 
towns, whereby both goods and people from afar converge. One such town would be 
Lào Cai, which lay between “China” and “Vietnam”, and was popular with “Chinese” 
merchants in the nineteenth century. Indeed, its importance was also noted by Liu 
Yongfu, who after moving around the borderlands, made Lào Cai his permanent base 
in the borderlands after ousting its previous overlord.
11
  
 Further research will collectively contribute to a more comprehensive history 
of the borderlands. Such a study would complement Yang Bin’s study on the 
“making” of Yunnan, which also sheds light on the making of China and world 
history.
12
 Similarly, studies centered on the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands can also 
inform the process of the making of Vietnam, particularly in its recent history, as it 
played an important role in the revolution.  
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APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AN!C   An Nam !"a Chí  
 
ANKL   An Nam Kí L#$c 
 
ANTC   An Nam T%p Chí 
 
BTL   Bách Th&n L'c  
 
BQD!DL  B(n Qu)c D# !"a D* L#$c  
 
BQSXTL   B(n Qu)c S+n Xuyên T,p Lãm  
 
BTBNLT  B(n Tri-u B%n Ngh"ch Li.t Truy.n  
 
BTTT   B(o Trai Thi T,p 
 
BNTT!DC/a   B/c Ninh Toàn T0nh !"a D# Chí  
 
BNTT!DC/b   B/c Ninh Toàn T0nh !"a D# Chí  
 
BNTT!DC/c   B/c Ninh Toàn T0nh !"a D# Chí  
 
BH!B   B/c Hành !* B(n  
 
CBST   Cao B1ng S2 Tích  
 
!CLS   !"a Chí L%ng S+n 
 
!K!DC/c  !*ng Khánh !"a D# Chí, t,p III 
 
!NNTC/IV  !%i Nam Nh3t Th)ng Chí T,p IV   
 
NCLS   Nghiên C4u L"ch S5 
 
NXB   Nhà Xu3t B(n 
 
STTC   S+n Tây T0nh Chí  
 
TQTP    Tuyên Quang T0nh Phú  
 
 
